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ABSTRACT
The introduction consists of a brief statement 
of the points at issue between the doctrines of internal 
nd external relations together with the programme to be 
fol.owed in the follov/iri chapters. I have tried to 
; it clear in the introduction that .ly rain concern 
in the following chapters will be with proffering a 
critical estimate of the doctrine of internal relations 
whose claim regarding the internality of all relations 
seems to me to be unjustified.
In the first chapter I have tried to show that 
Aristotle's treatment of the concept of relation contains 
in an implicit form the seeds of the doctrine of external 
relations. An attempt has also been made to show that 
the origin of two important views which the supporters 
of the doctrine of external relations claim that the 
internalists contradict can be traced in the writings 
of Aristotle. These are that relations are not qualities 
and that they do not always belong to the essences of 
things.
In the second chapter a refutation of the arguments 
of Bradley, the chief exponent of the doctrine of Ümternal 
relations, will put vjis in a good position to reject the 
doctrine of internal relations.
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I have tried to establish in the third chapter 
that the arguments employed by the internalists other 
than Bradley also do not stand the test of criticisms.
In the conclusion I have reiterated my claim 
that it is impossible for all relations to be internal.
I have also made it clear that I shall not try to answer 
the question whether, granted this, relations would be 
all, or only some of them, external, since my chief 
concern in the present paper is with denying the internality 
of all relations.
5.
INTRODUOTION
The issue of external and internal relations has 
received considerable attention from philosophers in modern 
times» Much has been said in support of the one or the 
other view of relations. The reason why these modern 
philosophers have shown so much interest in this issue is 
primarily this, that this issue is closely connected with 
two important ontological theories, viz., monism and 
pluralism. The doctrine of external relations, which is 
advocated by the pluralists has two different forms, a 
moderate one and an extreme one. According to the extreme 
one any relation that anything has to any other thing is 
external. According to the moderate one not all relations 
are external, but some are internal. The remaining alter­
native is the doctrine of internal relations, according to 
which all relations are internal»
I feel that our ideas on relations owe a great 
deal to the facts revealed in the course of discussions of 
the theory of internal relations by its exponents. Yet 
I cannot find myself in agreement with the theory of internal 
relations, although I feel that the more plausible view is 
the moderate form of the doctrine of external relations to 
the effect that some relations are external and some internal. 
In what follows I shall therefore try to make a critical
evaluation of the theory of internal relations as it is 
upheld by its chief supporters.
But in our attempt to make a critical evaluation 
of the doctrine of internal relations we shall meet at 
the very outset a great difficulty. The difficulty is 
that of finding an unequivocal statement of the doctrine 
of internal reltaions. As Ewing pointed out, (of. 'Idealism® 
by A. G. Ewing, 1934, pp. 117-194) there are at least ten 
different meanings of 'internal relation*. Research might 
find out more. But we might anyway try to find out some 
central meaning of the theory of internal relations. And 
we might roughly (without entering into the controversies 
arising out of the technical use of certain terms) distinguish 
between the theories of internal and external relations in 
the following ws^ r. According to the theory of internal 
relations the terms of the relations are necessarily related, 
so that if they did not have these relations they would not 
be what they are or would be other than what they are. 
According to the doctrine of external relations not all 
relations are necessary, at least some, if not all, relations 
being such that if the terms did not stand in them, they 
would still be what they are.
My main concern in this paper will therefore be, 
as it is evident from what I have said so far, not so much 
with settling the issue of internality and externality of
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relations and deciding whether all relations are external 
or whether some are, as with examining the claims of the 
interalists to the effect that all relations are internal.
In making a critical estimate of the doctrine of 
internal relations we shall depend a great deal on the 
criticisms of the doctrine advanced by the externalists.
In course of the exposition we shall try to show that two 
very important views held by the chief exponents of the 
theory of internal relations, namely that relations belong 
to the essence of things and that they are properties or 
qualities of things, are completely wrong. Pluralists 
who support the externality of relations have tried time 
and agian to point to the falsity of these views. Explicit 
formulation of the pluralists' view that relations do not 
always belong to the essences of things and tnat they are 
not qualities of anything can be found in the.writings of 
contemporary philosophers like Moore and Russell. But the 
origin of the views can be traced as far back as the writings 
of the philosophers of the earliest days like Aristotle.
At the beginning of the paper we shall therefore 
devote a considerable time to discussing Aristotle's views 
on the nature of relations. ./e shall pay this special 
attention to Aristotle *s views on the nature of relations 
not only for the above reasons but also for some other 
reasons. Firstly, many of the criticisms directed against 
the internality of relations show a strong similarity to,
ix not influence of, Aristotle's views on relations.
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Secondly, many of our criticisms of the theory of internal 
relations bank a great deal upon the concyets of essence ana 
accident, a fair treatment of which concepts directs us 
necessarily to Aristotle's views on them which we are 
forced to discuss in revealing Aristotle's views on the 
externality of relations.
In the course of our exposition we shall also 
consider some of the main arguments as these are proffered 
in some of the main historical treatments of the theory of 
internal relations. \/e shall examine first the arguments 
proffered by Bradley in support of the internality of all 
relations and then the arguments employed by philosophers 
other than Bradley like Bosanquet, Joachim, Ewing and 
Blanshard in support of the same view. v/e shall devote 
our second chapter to the examination of Bradley's arguments 
and our third chapter to the examination of the arguments 
presented by philosophers other than Bradley. We shall 
end our paper with some concluding remarks.
Italics used in the quotations at various places 
of the paper are always, unless specified, those used in 
the original.
I shall use two kinds of footnote in the following 
chapters, one kind introduced by asterisks, the other by 
numbers. Those introduced by numbers will be used exclusively 
for giving page references of the quotations used.
CHAPTER I
ARISTOTLE'S TREATMENT OF RELATION*
Aristotle's discussion of the concept of relation 
is one of the oldest ones available on the subject. And 
it is very interesting to note that even such an early 
discussion contains in an implicit form the seeds of the 
doctrine which later on emerged as the doctrine of external 
relations. The objective of this chapter is. to expound 
and examine Aristotle's discussion of the concept of relation 
and finally to show the insight with which he carried on 
the discussion.
Aristotle described relation as a category. 
According to Aristotle categories are the highest kinds of 
predicates and equally highest kinds of being which we 
recognise, the kinds of what things are.
It is not necessary for our present purpose to 
give a complete account of all the categories named by 
Aristotle. It is sufficient for our present purpose to 
go into some detail only with two main categories, namely, 
quality and relation, Aristotle discussed the categories
* Quotations used in this chapter from Aristotle's work. 
'Categories*, are from the translation of that work by J.L. 
Ackrill. Other quotations from his various works are from 
the Oxford Translation of his works.
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mainly in the logical works known as the 'Organon' and in 
the metaphysical work called 'Metaphysics', Therefore, 
in our account of the categories, we shall rely mainly 
on these works. v/e shall start our discussion of the 
categories with an account of the category of substance.
Substance; Examples of substance are man, horse,
etc.
In the 'Categories' Aristotle distinguishes between 
two kinds of substances, namely, first substance and second 
substance. First substance is the concrete individual 
thing which forms the subject of all logical predicates, 
and the substratum of all real attributes. Second substance 
comprises the species and genera under which first substances 
fell.
Quantity: In the 'Metaphysics' Aristotle defines
quantity as "that which is divisible into two or more 
constituent parts of which each is by nature a 'one' and 
a 'this'."^ (He is defining quantity as an actually 
extended body!) In the 'Metaphysics' he says, the dist­
inguishing mark of quantity is its measurability; whereas 
in the 'Categories' he says, the distinguishing mark is 
that equality and inequality may be predicated of it.
Quality; Examples of quality are white, grammatical
etc.
1. Metaphysics, 1020 a 8
il.
V/e shall devote a considerable amount of time 
in discussing both the category of quality and that of 
relation. The reason for so doing will reveal itself 
as we proceed.
In the 'Categories’ we read: quality is "that
in virtue of which things are said to be qualified some- 
how."^ Qualities are of four kinds: (l) habits and
dispositions of mind and body; (2) capacities or natural 
powers; (3) affective qualities (sensible); (4) figure 
or shape.
At several places in the 'Topics' Aristotle 
assigns the differentia to the category of quality. Con­
sider for example the statements: "the differentia always
indicates a quality of the genus" (Topics, 128a26). "no 
differentia indicates what a thing is, but rather of what 
sort it is, such as 'pedestrian* and 'biped* " (Topics,
122 bl6).
The description of quality in the(Metaphysics' 
adds very little to that given in the 'Organon*. However, 
we have, in the 'Metaphysics' the following classification 
of quality: (l) the differentia of the essence; (2) that
which exists, besides quantity in the essence of unchangeable
1. Categories, 8 b 25
* Metaphysics, 14.
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objects of mathematics, e.g. the plane and the solid as 
present in the composite numbers; (3) the modifications 
of substances in respect of which they change, e.g. heat and 
cold; (4) good and evil.
Relation; examples of relatives are, double, 
half, larger etc.
In the 'Categories' Aristotle has no noun for 
'relation', but exploits a preposition having the force 
'relative to', 'in relation to'. In this treatise he 
does not, for the most part, treat of relations (similarity, 
slavery etc.) but rather, in effect, of relatives (similar, 
slave). The distinction between relations or relational 
properties and relatives is drawn at the end of the chapter 
on relatives in the 'Metaphysics'; "Further, there are 
the properties in virtue of which the things that have 
them are called relatives, e.g. equality is relative, 
because the equal is, and likeness, because the like is."^ 
Relatives are discussed at considerable length 
in both the 'Organon' and the 'Metaphysics'.
In the 'Categories ' Aristotle gives two criteria 
for being a relative. The first criterion he mentions at 
the beginning of the chapter on Relatives. According to 
the first criterion "We call relatives all such things as
Metaphysics, 1021 b 6-8.
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are said to be just what they are, of or than other things,
or in some other way in relation to something else,"^
The second criterion appears in 8a28 of the 'Categories',
(similar criteria appear elsewhere also, e.g. in the Topics,
142a29, 146b3)• Aristotle introduced this second criterion
for a specific purpose. He had maintained right from the
beginning of the discussion about the categories that
substances are not relative. But towards the end of the
chapter on relatives he shows signs of being somewhat puzzled
as to whether substance can be relative in character. But
he decides definitely that in regard to primary substances
there is no such possibility, for "An individual man is not
called someone's individual man; nor an individual ox
2
someone's individual ox." He grants that in regard to 
some secondary substances (e.g, parts such as head and hand) 
"there is room for dispute."^ Hov/ever, he tries to evade 
the conclusion of calling those secondary substances like 
head and hand relatives with the help of the second revised 
criterion of relatives. According to the second criterion 
"those things are relatives for which being is the same 
as being somehow related to something,"t
1. Categories, 6a36.
2. Ibid, 8al5
3. Ibid, 8a26
4. Ibid, 8a32.
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The introduction of these two criteria has given 
rise to lots of controversies. There has been controversy 
specially about the difference between the two.
Certain points about the two criteria demand our 
attention. In the first place, according to Aristotle, 
the first criterion makes head and hand relatives, while 
the second does not. Secondly, the first criterion is 
about what is said, called, but the second is not so. 
Thirdly, according to Aristotle, whatever satisfies the 
second criterion also satisfies the first. Fourthly, the 
second criterion is said to have a consequence concerning 
the necessity of "knowing definitely" that to which some­
thing is related (Categories, 8a35~37). Aristotle writes: 
"It is clear . . . that if someone knows any relative 
definitely he will also know definitely that in relation 
to which it is spoken of." The fact that this necessity 
does/ not hold in the case of head and hand is taken to 
show that they are not, by the revised criterion, relatives 
(Categories, 8bl5-19)»
There is a very interesting discussion about the 
last poi&t in Mr. J. L. Ackrill*s notes on Aristotle’s 
Categories in his translation of Aristotle's 'Categories' 
and 'De Interpretations' (with notes). Because of lack 
of space it is not possible to reproduce the discussion 
in detail, though some segments of the discussion demand
15.
consideration.
According to Mr. Ackerill the last point might 
do a great deal in clarifying the distinction between 
the two criteria. Aristotle seems to be saying that, 
according to the second criterion it is impossible to 
know that X is relative without knowing what it is relative 
to; whereas according to the first criterion it is possible 
to know that X is relative without knowing what it is 
relative to, though it would necessarily be relative to 
something. But this would make the second criterion 
too strong. It would not include 'half', 'slave* etc. in 
the category of relatives, since it is possible to know 
that a number like 55 is 'half* of some number, that Oallias 
is a 'slave', without knowing what 55 ia half of, and who 
Callias' master is. We might water down the strong 
criterion by saying that one may know that X is relative 
without knowing what it is relative to, it being required 
only that someone knows or could find out what it is 
relative to. But then the criterion would seem to include 
'hand* and 'head', given that a 'hand* or 'head* must 
be someone's hand or head. Alternatively, we might lay 
emphasis on the phrase "definitely know" and say that one 
cannot definitely know that 55 is half of some number 
without knowing what that number is. But then no reason 
is apparent why it should be possible to know definitely
16
that X is a head without knowing whose head it is.
Anyway, we must conclude that Aristotle *s 
introduction of the two criteria of relatives leaves room 
for much controversy. And it is not easy to know what 
Aristotle ‘s answers to these charges might have been.
Aristotle writes in the 'Categories' that the
*
category of relation sometimes admits of contraries and
X X
of variation in degree, but not always. Every relative 
has a correlative, and the two are ^interdependent. The 
correlative becomes clear only when the relative is given 
its correct name, and, in some cases, if there is no current
X X X
term for the correlative, one must be coined for it.
In his explicit treatment of relative terms in 
the 'Metaphysics', Aristotle shows that, relations are based 
on: (l) unity and number, e.g., as are equality and in­
equality; (2) action and passion, for "things that are 
active or passive imply an active or passive potency and 
the actualisation of the potencies";^ e.g. "as that which
o
can heat to that which can be heated", ; (3) measure, for
"that which is measurable or knowable or thinkable is called 
relative because something else involves reference to it."^,
* Categories, 6bl5
** Ibid, 6b20
*** Ibid, 7blO-12
lo Metaphysics, 1021al5
2. Ibid, 1020b28 
3o Ibid, 1021a30-B32
17.
e.g., as the mind is related to that which the mind knows, 
because the latter is the measure of the knowledge in the
X
mi nd.
In the 'Metaphysics*, Aristotle describes "what is 
relative" as the "least of all things a ^ind of entity
or substance".^ The reason, "is the fact that it alone
p
has no proper generation or destruction or movement."
'./hile there is change in respect to substance, quantity, 
quality, place, any change in respect to relation, always
results from change in one or more of the above four.
That there may be change in respect to relation in which 
the thing related does not change at all, but only the 
correlative changes, is a sign, says Aristotle, of the 
superficiality of the category.
Place and time are discussed by Aristotle in the 
fourth book of the 'Physics'.
Place ; examples of place are, in the Lyceum, 
in the market place etc.
"The existence of place", he says, "is held to 
be obvious from the fact of mutual replacement."^ " /hen 
therefore another body occupies the came place,he place is 
thought to be different from all the bodies
* Cf. Metaphysics, 1056 b 35
1. Metaphysics, 1088a23
2. Ibid, 1088a30
3. Physics, 208bl
18
which come to be in it and replace one another."^ Aris­
totle distinguishes between a common place in "vniich all
bodies are"; and the special place "occupied primarily 
2
by each."
Time : examples of time are yesterday, last
year etc.
Time, he reasons, implies both change and movement. 
Hence he defines it as the "number of movement in respect 
of before and a f t e r . T i m e  is measured by the 'now' and 
'movement '.
Action and Passion; Action and passion are 
discussed in xhe 'Metaphysics' only. Examples of the 
former are: cutting, burning etc; and that of the latter
are: being cut, being burned etc.
When two things come in contact, of which one is 
actually what the other is potentially, a change occurs. 
Viewing that change as the actualisation of the potential, 
we term it action, considering it as the potential becoming 
actualised, we term it passion.
Position (Posture) and Condition (State): 
examples of the former are: is lying, is sitting etc; and
examples of the latter are: has shoes on, has armour on etc.
lo Physics, 208 b4-6
2. Ibid, 209a32-3j
3. Ibid, 220a25.
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Position and condition are nowhere discussed 
by Aristotle. In fact, the only two complete enumerations 
in vAich he mentions them are found in the logical treat­
ises, 'Categories' and 'Topics'. Aristotle's doctrine 
of categories, at least the way in which he presents it, 
is avowedly full of insoluble difficulties. (1) In the 
first place, several of the items he has placed in the 
particular categories do obviously tend to be classified 
in different categories. V/e might refer in this connection 
to the passage lOalb of the 'Categories'. Here Aristotle 
says that 'open textured ' and 'close textured ' are not 
qualities; since they signify rather the position of the 
various parts of tne wnole things. But if this is so, 
then according to his own interpretation entities represented 
by locutions denoting shape and outward configuration of 
things should be classified under position, in spite of 
the fact that he regarded shape and external configuration 
of things as qualities.
(2) In the second place, his classification is 
not fully exhaustive. In some places Aristotle has left 
no hint as to which category an item should belong to.
For example, although Aristotle denied that 'open-textured' 
and‘close-textured' signify qualities, yet it is not clear 
into which category Aristotle himself would have wished to 
put openness of textures, roughness etc. Moreover, there
20
are expressions like 'knowledge of music', 'multiple of 3'. 
Now are these locutions combinations of words each of which 
stand for things belonging to different categories; or do 
the entire expressions stand for single items to be located 
each in a single category? There are obviously more reasons 
for taking the latter view, because 'knowledge of music' is 
not a mere union of words representing things belonging 
to different categories like the expression 'bent stick'.
'X knows music' cannot be dissolved as 'X is a bent stick' 
can be, into 'X is bent' and 'X is a stick'. Moreover, 
these expressions are similar to expressions like 'capacity 
to resist easy division' and 'incapacity to resist division', 
which represent hardness and softness. And since hardness, 
softness etc. are according to Aristotle items each in a 
single category, is it not natural to regard 'knowledge of 
music', 'multiple of 3 ' as signifying single entities belong­
ing to single categories?
Yet it is not easy to find a place for things 
represented by expressions of this kind in the Aristotelian 
scheme of categories. Aristotle himself seems to put 
'knowledge of grammar' into the category of quality (cf. 
Categories, lla36). But does not such an expression 
obviously have some resemblance to expressions denoting 
relatives? Neither should we treat such expressions as 
denoting some entity that falls both u#der quality and
21.
relation since in that case it will point to a weakness 
in the very foundations of the distinctness of the 
different categories.
(3) In third place, Aristotle gives a list of 
ten categories; but the question seems unavoidable: do
the categories not seem to overlap? This question arises 
specially because of certain conflicting statements 
Aristotle makes in many places. Take for example the 
remarks in the passage from lla20 to lla36 (the same 
passage v/e have just been considering) : " V/e should not
be disturbed lest someone may say that though we proposed 
to discuss quality we are counting in many relatives (since 
states and conditions are relatives). For in pretty well 
all such cases the genera are spoken of in relation to 
something, but none of the particular cases is. For 
knowledge, a genus, is called just what it is, of something 
else (it is called knowledge of something); but none of 
the particular cases is called just what it is, of something 
else. For example, grammar is not called grammar of some­
thing nor music music of something." How this passage 
does not seem to fit in with the notion behind the Aristo­
telian genus - species classification and the Aristotelian 
division of the categories. If any particular species of 
a genus does not come under that genus, what ground is there 
for saying that it is a species of that genus? If any
22.
species of relative is not relative, why should we call 
it a species of relative, rather than a species of quality? 
Categories are like genera. If any species of one category 
can be a species of another category, how can we then 
distinguish between one category and another? The last 
paragraph of the chapter on quality also throws doubt on 
the validity of the distinction of the categories: "More­
over, if the same thing really is a qualification and a 
relative there is nothing absurd in its being counted in 
both the genera."^ Perhaps we can defend Aristotle in 
the following way.
Aristotle divides knowledge into its species in 
the Topics. He says, "the differentiae of relatives are 
themselves relative, as in the case also of knowledge.
This is classified as speculative, practical and productive;
2
and each of these denotes a relation." This division of 
knowledge into its several species is different from the 
division we have shown in the last paragraph. And in this 
way we might avoid the question, how the species may not be 
relative while it# genus is so, by saying that 'knowledge 
of music' is not a proper species of knowledge. Moreover, 
since theoretical knowledge, practical knowledge etc. are 
relatives, acceptance of these as species of knowledge
1. Categories, lla37
2. Topics, 145al3-l8*
23.
raises no categorical problem. But if we try to defend
Aristotle in this way, the question arises, what are we to
do with expressions like 'knowledge of grammar', 'multiple
of 3*? The attempt to fit things denoted by such expressions
into Aristotle's scheme of categories gives rise to the
dilemma which we have shown on page 2D.
So we must admit that the way in which Aristotle
presents the doctrine of categories is full of difficulties*
But the fact that Aristotle's presentation of the
doctrine of categories is defective does not necessarily
throw doubt on the very possibility of such a doctrine*
There might appear much truth in the doctrine, if it were
revised and presented in a different way* Perhaps Aristotle
himself was aware of the defects in his presentation of the
doctrine, and he might have thought of revising the doctrine.
That this is a possibility, occurs to us specially because
of Aristotle's reducing the number of categories from ten
to four in his later works. Perhaps he was aware of the
fact later that the categories which he had formerly thought
to be distinct are not all equally distinct; and was trying
*
to make the list of categories perfect*
So a revised and perfect classification of things 
into the different categories does not seem impossible, Such
* Of, Physics, 200b30, which seems to subsume action and 
passion under relation*
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categories might be exhaustive as well as distinct. The 
scope of this chapter does not permit the possibility of a 
detailed examination of the question of the possibility of 
such a perfect list of categories. But an examination of 
the question of the distinctness of the categories appears 
to be possible as well as very useful for the present 
chapter for reasons that will be obvious later on. So let 
us undertake such an examination.
In some cases the distinctness of some of the 
categories does appear to be maintainable if we conduct 
a closer analysis of the categories in question and remove 
some of the obvious defects of Aristotle's presentation of 
them. For example, at first sight, it might be thought 
that state is hardly distinguishable from quality, nor 
position from place. But a closer analysis and examination 
will show that the case is not really like that. A state 
is something which characterises a whole through the 
condition of its parts; thus we call a man shod, because 
he has shoes on his feet. A quality, on the other hand is 
comparatively simple, and if it characterises a whole, it 
does so through being present in the same way in its various 
partSf dr anyway in the various parts of its surface. 
Striking examples of such qualities are colours. If we 
call a sheet red, we do so beause all parts of it are alike 
red. One might ask, how can the same thing be true of 
shape or external configuration? It might be said of a
25;.
man that his shape is square. Surely all the parts of 
his body are not square! But a defence of Aristotle is 
not impossible if v/e remind ourselves of our previous 
discussion where we remarked that in Aristotle's system 
shape ought to be included under the category of position.
But Aristotle has spoken very little about the 
last six categories, i.e. place, time, action, passion, 
position and condition. So we cannot be sure if Aristotle 
did really think that these categories are all distinct* 
Perhaps he did not think that they are all equally distinct, 
since he sometimes gives shorter lists of categories or 
leaves their precise number vague. At any rate, even if 
he did think them to be distinct, yet he did not make any 
explicit attempt to show the ultimateness of the last six 
categories. But he has devoted a considerable time to 
describing the first four categories of substance, quantity, 
quality and relation. And it is evident from his discussion 
of these categories that the difference between these 
categories is more fundamental than that between others; 
because although he reduced the number of categories in many 
places, yet he rather omitted the latter six categories 
than the former four. And he even made explicit attempts 
to show the distinctness of these four (as will appear 
from our later discussion). Anyway, the question of the 
distinctness of the four categories is very important to us; 
and we must devote our attention to these four categories.
26,
Are these categories mutually exclusive? And more import­
ant for our present purpose is the question of the distinct­
ness of the categories of quality and relation. Are these 
two categories mutually exclusive? And this question is 
a vital one, as will be obvious later. îhe question arises 
specially after reading the passage (which we have already 
seen to throw doubt on the validity of the distinctness of 
the categories in general*) to the effect that there is 
nothing absurd in counting the same thing under both the 
genera of quality and relation, I think the two categories 
are mutually exclusive for Aristotle; and the distinctness 
of the two can be shown on the basis of Aristotle's treat­
ment of them. Yet we must admit that the question is not 
easily answerable.
The question is really a difficult one, and it 
cannot be answered by a superficial glance at Aristotle's 
account of the two categories. Even apart from the question 
whether Aristotle's account of the two categories is suffic­
ient to show the distinctness and ultimateness of the two, 
there might still remain the question; are relation and 
quality two irreducible things?
In fact, we see a propensity among certain thinkers 
to overlook the distinction between relation and quality.
* See the third paragraph of page Z% - end of first para­
graph of page 22.
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ïVe can refer in this connection to Johnson %s view of relation
*
as a transitive adjective. He says that in addition to 
ordinary adjectives which usually refer only to the sub­
stantives which they characterise, there are adjectives of 
another type which exhibit a reference to some substantives 
other than that which they directly characterize. Adjectives 
of this other type are relations. Comparing the two pro­
positions 'X sleeps* and *X hits Y*, we note that 'sleeps* 
is an intransitive and 'hits* a transitive verb. Accordingly, 
he maintains that we ought properly to call 'sleeping* an 
intransitive and 'hitting* a transitive adjective. Thus, 
we see that Johnson defines relation as a 'transitive 
adjective*. Are we then to say that relations can be reduced 
to qualities? I think that examination will show that 
Johnson's view is not a tenable one.
It is an acknowledged general rule that, the 
definiens should not contain anything that may even indirectly 
tend to contain the definiendum, jlhere are of course 
exceptions to this rule (cf. H. Robinson's book on Definition); 
although they do not apply to this particular case. An 
example of such an exception would be a definition of
'diagonal* which read 'a square is divided into two isosceles
**]
trianjes by a diagonal,*J But this rule seems to be
* See W.E.Johnson's Logic, Vol. I, p.204n.
** Of, R. Gr. Robinson's 'Definition', p. 145
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violated by Johnson in his suggested definition of relation 
as a transitive adjective, for the very word 'transitive' 
conveys a sense of relation. 'Transition' or reference to 
another implies indirectly being in relation with another.
This tendency to reduce relation to quality, 
thinks Russell, is seen also in traditional logic. Trad­
itional logic holds that all propositions have the subject- 
predicate form. It believes that that which is predicable 
of a term is its property. Now relational propositions, 
being of the same form, predicate something of the sub­
stantive, and hence relations are qualities.
But relational propositions are of such a kind,
maintains Russell, that if we reduce them to subject-predicate
form, and say that what are predicated in such propositions
are qualities, they cannot convey the meaning they seek to
express. So Russell objects to the tendency to identify
*
relation with quality. He says that the main objection 
against taking relations as qualities comes from the consid­
eration of asymmetrical relations. Symmetrical relations 
such as equality or inequality can be regarded as expressing 
possession of a common property or different properties.
But when we come to asymmetrical relations, such as greater 
and less, the attempt to reduce them to qualities becomes
* See Russell's 'Our Knowledge of the External V/orld', 
1922, pp. 58-59*
29
impossible. To say that when one thing is greater than 
another, and not merely unequal to it, that means that 
they have different magnitudes, is to say something that 
is incapable of explaining the facts. Thus we shall have to 
say that one magnitude is greater than the other; and thus 
we shall have failed to get rid of the relation of greater 
and less,
Gan we get any suggestions from Aristotle's writing;
about how to distinguish quality from relation? I think
we can. And I also think that this suggestion reflects
Aristotle's view on the externality of relations which we
*
hinted at at the beginning of this chapter. Aristotle 
placed relation and quality in two separate categories.
At one place of course, ' as we have seen, he leaned danger­
ously towards obliterating the distinction between relation 
and quality by saying that there is nothing extraordinary 
in any item's comin& under both the classes of relation and 
quality.*** But in spite of this v/e might say that 
Aristotle must have thought relation and quality to be 
distinct; otherwise he could have reduced them to one
* See page 9.
** See page 22
*** Of. Categories, lla37*
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category instead of making them two. As we have already 
suggested, Aristotle mi^ht not have thought seriously about 
the problem at the time of writing the 'Categories',
He did; however, say explicitly that the distin- 
guishing mark of relatives is that they always require 
correlatives (Categories, 6b28), while that of qualities 
is that they are responsible for similarity (Categories, 
Half). But we must admit that the last criterion is not 
a very strong one. Two persons, for example, two brothers, 
might be similar not only by virtue of possessing some common 
characters like both having brown hair, but also because 
both of them have the same relation to the parents. So 
we have to conclude that although Aristotle did make some 
attempts to distinguish the two, yet his criteria were not 
very strong. At the same time it is very interesting 
to note that Aristotle left some suggestions for distin­
guishing the two categories, which, it worked out, might 
have been a stronger criterion for distinguishing the two 
categories,
The suggestion referred to is this, that qualities 
can be essential to things whereas relations can never be so. 
That Aristotle believed in the insubstantiality of relations 
is obvious from his writings. And that he believed in 
the essentiality of some qualities is also obvious enough.
Ye shall give evidence for holding such a view very
31,
*
soon. Let us for the present resume our discussion. It 
must be said that although Aristotle held qualities in 
some cases to be essential, yet if he were to prove explicitly 
the distinctness of the two categories by this means, he 
ought to have said that every quality is essential to some­
thing or other; otherwise he could make only the weaker 
claim that only some qualities are essential, and he could 
not then avoid the dangerous consequence, which someone 
might press him to accept, of assimilating relations to 
those qualities (or some of them) which are not parts of 
essences. In order to strengthen the claim to distinguish 
relation from quality, some such view as the following 
might have been profitable to Aristotle.
There are in nature species, and also classes of 
inanimate objects. Some qualities are essential to any 
member of a certain species or class. Heat for example, 
is essential to fire, cold to ice, sweetness to honey, 
sound to music. Besides these essential qualities members 
of these classes or species possess some other qualities 
also which are not essential to any member of these classes 
and species. But though these qualities are not essential 
to members of these classes, they are essential to members
* See pages 34 ^-35i(enâ .of-first paragraph).
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of other classes or species. The quality cold for example, 
is not essential to water. But coldness is essential to 
ice. Sweetness is not essential to milk or apple, but it 
is essential to sugar and honey.
I am just suggesting that some such view might have 
been more profitable to Aristotle than just saying that 
qualities do in some cases belong to essences of things.
What I am doing here is not trying to prove definitely that 
every quality is essential to something or other, The 
scope of the present chapter does not permit the possibility 
of undertaking such an examination of all qualities and 
trying to show that every quality is essential to something 
or other. So all that we can do is to say that it might 
have been possible for someone, if he undertook such a task, 
to show by dividing the properties up into groups that 
every quality is essential to something, and he might have 
been able to say that every quality is essential to something 
whereas relations are never so.
Aristotle may not have made an unqualified assertion 
like the above one, but he undoubtedly made at least the 
weaker claim that all relatives are accidents, but qualities 
may in some cases be essential to things. Aristotle 
explicitly described relation as an accident in his account 
of the 'predicables*. We read also in the 'racomacbean 
Ethics': "That which is per se, i.e., substance, is prior
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in nature to the relative (for the latter is like an offshoot
and accident of being)";  ^ Aristotle's discussion of the
concept of relation in the 'Metaphysics', also, bears evidence
of his view of relation as an accident. As we have alrecdy 
*
read, Aristotle describes in the 'Metaphysics', "What is
relative" as the "least of all things a kind of entity or
2 * *  substance." The reason, we saw, is given as, "the fact
that it alone has no proper generation or destruction or
movement."^ If relation be such that change in respect of
relation makes no change in the thing related, then relation
cannot be the essence. for a thing cannot lose its essential
property without losing its identity.
It might be asked now, granted that Aristotle held
relation to be an accident, but is not the same thing true
of quality? Did he not list quality also in the account
of the 'predicables' as an accident of being? Our answer
is that it is true. Yet it is obvious that Aristotle
treated some qualities of things as essential to the things.
V/e can establish this point in the following way.
1. Nicomachean Ethics, 14, 1096 a 20-22
2. Metaphysics, 1088 a 23*
3. Ibid, 1088 a 30.
* See page 17«
** See page 17.
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In discussing 'definition' Aristotle says that 
definition is the statement of essence. Let us take some 
such definition; Man is a rational animal. Now what are 
animality and rationality? Are they not qualities? Are 
not animality and rationality that in virtue of which a 
particular individual is called a human being? One might 
object here to the treatment of animality as a quality.
Still rationality is undoubtedly a quality in the Aristotelian 
sense, since rationality is a differentia and Aristotle
*
himself said in the 'Metaphysics' that quality is in one 
sense the "differentia of the essence."^ And although Aris­
totle himself did not assign any place for animality in the 
categori.al. scheme, yet we can say at least this that if 
we follow his own criteria for things belonging to different 
categories, then we ought to describe animality as a quality. 
Animality is definitely not a relation, nor a substance 
('animal' is of course a secondary substance but animality 
is not), nor a quantity nor place etc. So there are good 
reasons for treating animality also as a quality. Moreover, 
if, as we have seen Aristotle himself saying in the 'Meta­
physics ', quality is in some sense the differentia of the
1. Metaphysics, 1020 a 34
* v/e have already referred to this point on page 11.
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essence, then surely to that extent quality constitutes 
essence, since essence consists of genus and differentia. 
Again, Aristotle also describes one type of quality, in the 
Metaphysics, as that which exists besides quantity in the 
essence of unchangeable objects of mathematics.*
Aristotle had a firm conviction that relations 
cannot be essences. And this conviction contains the seeds 
of the doctrine of external relations. I also think that 
this is theyreason why Aristotle did not reduce quality to 
relation, in spite of the great difficulty he had to face 
in distinguishing the two.
There might be a demurrer to our claim that 
Aristotle held qualities to be different from relations.
It might be said that according to Aristotle the different 
answer to the question 'of what sort is it?' represent the 
qualities. Now an answer to the question 'what sort of 
a man is he?' might be 'brave', 'generous'. Thus 'generous*, 
'brave* etc. would be qualities according to Aristotle's 
criterion of a quality. But it might be said that since 
'generous*, 'brave' etc. are relational properties, if they 
are held to be qualities, it would fol_ow that a quality is 
relational. We might answer such an objection by saying 
that 'generous*, 'kind' etc. are not relational in the sense
* We have already referred to this point on page 11-»12
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in which 'father of, 'larger than* etc, are relational.
If the son does not exist then the property 'father of' 
cannot exist, or at least it cannot be instantiated in 
the subject under discussion. It could in other subjects 
of course. If Y does not exist, then we cannot impute the 
property 'larger than Y ' to X, But the qualities 'generous* 
and 'kind ' when ascribed to any person, are not dependent 
on the relations to any other person in that way. Even if 
there exists no individual to which the person can be gener­
ous, even if the man whom we call generous has no property, 
the man can still be called generous in the dispositional 
sense. (0f course the person concerned must have the 
concept of property and the concept of an other man to 
whom he can be generous; yet he could be called generous 
even in the absence of material property or the absence of 
the person to whom he can be generous).
But the supporter of the Aristotelian view will
* A bit of complication’is of course associated with what 
I say here. It might be said that what I say here might be 
true of properties such as 'larger than'. But it is not 
obvious, it might be said, that what I say works also for 
intentional functions such as 'thinking of*. X may now be 
thinking of the King of France (perhaps without realising 
that there is no King of France at present). Thus although 
the King of France does not exist, X can still 'think of* 
him, in an intentional way* But it is obvious that the 
issue involved here leads us to a rather large topic a 
thorough discussion of which is not possible within the 
limited scope of the present paper.
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have to face another set of objections if he wants to demon­
strate the distinction between quality and relation with the 
help of the notions like essence and accident. Someone 
might impugn the very distinction between essence and 
accident,
V/e need some more elucidation of the point here.
Aristotle distinguished essence and accident on several
grounds. One of the grounds is that those attributes which
*1"must inhere in their subjects of necessity" are essential
attributes. The subject must possess them. Their loss
would result in the destruction of the subject. Attributes
other than these are accidents. An accident is an attribute
"which may . . . belong or not belong to any one and the self-
* *2same thing," an attribute is thus an accident if the
object would remain in substance the same even without it.
Let us turn our attention to another very important aspect 
of this concept of essence. Aristotle classified things 
according to genus and species. Things belong to the same 
species if they share some particular (not just any) common 
characters. These characters are the essence. He apparently 
believed species to be fixed and tended to ignore what could
* Italic used is mine.
** Italic used is mine.
1. Posterior Analytics, 73 b 24.
2o Topics, 102 b 7.
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not be classified within them. This shortcoming is held 
by modern philosophers like Stebbing to be fatal. Stebbing 
maintains that the modern theory of evolution destroys the 
basis of Aristotle's essence theory.*
Aristotle believed in natural kinds and species.
He also believed species to be fixed and unchanging. In 
his view ancestors of present species have never been very 
different from their present descendants. Roughly speaking 
his theory was like this: from eternity there were in the
world some definite species. But modern theory of evolution 
has provided a different explanation of the species.
According to this theory living organisms have all arisen 
from a unified and simple ancestry by a long sequence of 
differentiation of descent lines from that ancestry.
According to this modern theory species are now considered 
to have been evolved from pre-existing species by gradual 
modification and to have no absolutely fixed character. 
Acceptance of the theory of evolution involved the corollary 
that neither are the characters of the species fixed, nor are 
the present species replicas of their ancestors.
Similar objections are raised by Locke also.
Locke, for example, says that what Aristotle calls essences 
are really inventions or the workmanship of the understanding.
* Of. L.8.A.Stebbing's *A Modern Introduction to Logic', p.433
** Of. Locke's 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding', III,
3, 12, 13 and 14.
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Our abstract ideas of species, he says, are made up of 
complex ideas of similar particular substances, retaining 
only wnat is common to those different complex ideas. There 
is no generality in nature corresponding to these abstract 
ideas. He calls these ideas nominal essences.
The construction of nominal essences is usually 
relative to practical interests, and different interests 
lead people to classify things in different ways. Similar 
views to the effect that the distinction between essential 
and accidental properties are relative were held by John 
Dewey (who held the distinction to be relative to our sub­
jective interests in them*) and C. I. Lewis (who held the 
distinction to be relative to our vocabulary**). Class­
ification is solely dependent on particular interests; and 
the selection of what we regard as essential for a class is 
not absolutely so, it is somewhat arbitrary. (But it is 
only somewhat arbitrary, not absolutely so. Because some 
selections are better than others). The distinction between 
essence and accident is not made from any objective stand­
point, but from a somewhat subjective one. So we capnot 
make any absolute distinction between essence and accident.
* Cf. John Dewey's 'Logic, The Theory of Inquiry', p.138.
** Cf. 0. I. Lewis' 'An Analysis of Knowledge ana Valuation', 
p.41*
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The objections roughly amount to this: since
fixity of species cannot be maintained, therefore the 
distinction between certain properties as essential and 
others as not essential to species cannot be maintained.
This distinction is more or less arbitrary depending on the 
interest with which we classify. Now Aristotle was concerned 
solely with showing the essences of natural species. But the 
concepts of essence and accident are not confined within 
the sphere of natural species only. They are applicable 
also in the sphere of inanimate objects. So doubt as to 
the validity of the distinction between essential and 
inessential properties may also arise in the case of inanimate 
objects. So someone might sa^ r that since classification 
is relative to interest, in this sphere, there are no
a ®
objective grounds for distinguishing between essential and 
inessential properties.
Our answer is that although we cannot maintain the 
fixity of species, yet that does not disprove the existence 
of natural species. Y/e are struck by the remarkable 
biological phenomenon that two similar animals reproduce 
offspring with qualities similar to theirs. But the new 
offspring does not have the characters peculiar to another 
species. This is what happens naturally. We can of course 
somstimes interfere with the natural course of events and 
interbreed with the help of members of different species.
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But that does not disprove what happens naturally and normally 
So there are objective reasons for calling a species a 
species. What are called essential properties of a species 
are by no means our arbitrary and subjective selection.
There are objective reasons for saying that lions and tigers 
form two different species.
Secondly, we might classify inanimate objects in 
as many ways as we like according to interests and useful­
ness; still, when we do classify, there are objective 
reasons for our doing so. Our regarding the qualities as 
essential to tiat class does not by any means depend merely 
on our subjective and arbitrary selection. So the distinct­
ion between essence and accident is a valid one.
We may conclude that though the form in which 
Aristotle presented the distinction between essence and 
accident may not be free from defects, still the distinction 
between essence and accident is a valid one. So we can 
say that there are some properties which can very well be 
spoken of as essential and that some qualities belong to that 
class of properties. With the help of this revised form of 
the doctrine of essence and accident we can distinguish 
qualities which are sometimes essential from relations which 
are never so.
Now such a view as the above one of the nature of 
relation contains in an implicit form the seeds of the
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doctrine of external relations. The exponents of this doctrine 
differ among themselves regarding the nature of relation.
Some regard some relations as external while others are 
internal, and others seem to be in favour of treating all 
relations as external. But all of them are at one in 
rejecting the theory of internal relations, according to 
which all relations are internal.
Aristotle maintained that relations are external 
or non-essential. I think that Aristotle’s view is commend­
able, in spite of its defects, in suggesting (at such an 
early stage of the discussion of the concept of relation) 
the externality Of relations,
Aristotle’s view then, we seei, contains in a 
nebulous form the doctrine of external relations* And it 
is interesting to note here that the tendency to distinguish 
between relation and quality looks like being a character­
istic feature of philosophers who support the externality 
of relations. Aristotle, to whom the realist philosophers 
owe much of their views, believed them to be different and 
struggled hard to show the difference between the two 
(although he did not insist on it in the last resort).
Russell, who for all we know, might have been influenced 
by Aristotle's treating relations and qualities as belonging 
to separate categories, argued very strongly against reducing 
relations to qualities in several places of his works.
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His argument applies in fact not only against reducing 
relations to qualities, but against treating relations as 
properties even. Moreover, Aristotle’s claim that relations 
do not always belong to the essences of things seems to be, 
as we shall see in the next chapter, echoed in the arguments 
used by modern philosophers like Moore and Ayer, showing the 
externality of relations.
Before closing the present chapter let us take a 
glance at some objections that might be raised against 
imputing the view of externality of relations to Aristotle. 
Someone might refer to certain passages in Aristotle’s 
writings and say that these passages give contrary evidence 
to our ascription., Attention might be directed to Aristotle’s 
definition of certain natural phenomena like eclipse and 
thunder. Aristotle defines eclipse, for example, as 
"Deprivation of light . . .  by the earth’s coming in between."^ 
Since definition states the essence of a thing, one might 
say that this is a case where relation to something else is 
treated as an essential attribute of eclipse. So at least 
in some cases Aristotle believed relation to be essential 
or internal to a thing. But it must be noticed that in 
cases like this Aristotle is not speaking of essences of 
things but of events only. And although there may be doubt
1, Metaphysics, 1044 b 15*
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as to whether Aristotle believed the relations between
certain natural phenomena to be external, there is no
doubt that he believed in the externality of all the
relations between all the particular things.
Again, Aristotle defines house as " bricks and
timbers in such and such a position^", threshold as " 'wood or
1
stone in such and such a position' ", So it seems that 
relation to something else is essential to a house or 
threshold. But here what is essential to a house or thresh­
old is not its relation to something other than itself, 
but only its having a certain structure, only its having a 
certain form.
Moreover, Aristotle says that the motion of all 
things in the universe is due to God, the prime mover.
The prime mover moves only as being the object of desire.
It itself is never changed by anything beyond itself. , Yet 
everything in the universe is related to God. The prime 
mover is the single ruler of the universe, that on which
p
"the heavens and the world of nature" "depend". So the 
dependence of things of the universe on God seems to be 
internal to the things. But our answer to this objection 
is that even according to this view things do not depend on 
God for their qualities or essence, they depend on Kim for 
their existence only.
1. Metaphysics, 1043 a 6ff
2. Ibid, 1072 b 13.
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GHAFUER II 
BRADLEY ON IM'JERNAI. RELATIONS
III the preceding chapter we have expounded and 
examined Aristotle's view of the nature of relations and 
have shown that his treatment of the concept of relation 
contains in a nebulous form the doctrine of external relations. 
Y/e should now look at the arguments advanced by the internalists 
in support of their claim that all relations are internal. 
Bradley is supposed to be one of the chief exponents of the 
doctrine of internal relations, although he himself claimed 
that he held this doctrine only as relatively true, i.e., 
truer than the external relations view (both in its extreme 
and moderate forms), against which he directed his criticisms 
mainly. Many leading idealists in the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries were highly impressed by his views on 
this subject, and they supported the doctrine of internal 
relations with arguments more or less similar to his. As I 
have said before I cannot find myself in sympathy with the 
doctrine of internal relations although I feel that our 
notions of relations owe a great deal to the facts revealed 
in the course of discussions of this theory by its advocates.
* Bradley sometimes uses the terms 'intrinsic relations' and 
'extrinsic relations' instead of 'internal relations' and 
'external relations'.
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So I think it would pay us immensely to examine Bradley's 
view in order to give a critical evaluation of the doctrine 
of internal relations.
In making a critical survey of Bradley's views on 
this topic, we shall show the defects inherent in Bradley's 
view and shall show that the main defect of his view is 
that it makes two claims neither of which dan stand the 
test of criticisms, viz., that relations are qualities and 
that relations belong to the essences of things. And it 
is interesting to note that these two important facts about 
the nature of relations, viz., that they are not qualities 
and that they are not parts of the essences of things, were 
pointed out long ago by Aristotle as they are pointed out 
in modern times by philosophers like Russell, Moore and 
Ayer.
A very thorough and precise exposition of Bradley's 
views about the notion of relation itself can be found in the 
third chapter of his 'Appearance and Reality*, the cnapter 
which, according to the author, gives us, so to speak, a 
key to the entire book. Some interpreters of Bradley’s 
philosophy, like Prof. R. V/ollheim, are of the opinion that 
in this chapter he argues against the possibility of the 
theory of external relations and gives at the same time an 
exposition of the concept of internal relations. I am not 
sure whether Bradley himself meant this chapter to be taken 
in this way, because a glance at this chapter does not.
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at least at the outset, convey to one the impression that 
he there engages himself in settling the issue of internality 
and externality of relations. All his interest appears at 
the outset to be in showing the logical inconsistencies 
involved in the relational way of thought. He seriously 
set before himself the task of impugning the doctrine of 
external relations and pleading for the relative merit of 
the doctrine of internal relations mainly in the Appendix 
B which he added to the second edition of 'Appearance and 
Reality'. In his unfinished essay called 'Relations' 
which was published posthumously and in several places of 
the book 'Essays on Truth and Reality ' also, Bradley tries, 
to a certain extent, to show the relative merit of the doct­
rine of internal relations over that of external relations. 
Yet, it appears from reading those above-mentioned pieces 
that these latter writings do not contain any new view that 
was not already expressed in the third chapter of 'Appearance 
and Reality. '* Bradley's explicit arguments against 
externality and his arguments for internality of relations 
are really exposition and elaboration of pithy arguments
* Regarding the essay, 'Relations', Bradley himself said 
that it contains nothing really new. It deals with the 
same pKpititl of unsatisfactoriness of any ' "relational" 
stage of experience' about which he spoke before. Prob­
ably he is referring here to his showing of the contra­
diction involved in relational way of thinking in the 
third chapter of 'Appearance and Reality
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against the reality of relations appearing in the third 
chapter of 'Appearance and Reality'. Thus although the 
primary source of Bradley's views on externality and inter­
nality of relations is the Appendix, yet we shall do well to 
scrutinise the embryonic forms of the arguments against 
externality of relations (as they are found in the third 
chapter), which were later on made explicit in the Appendix, 
while all the time keeping it in mind that these arguments 
were primarily directed against the relational way of 
thinking.
Our task of finding out Bradley's exact views 
about any issue is made very difficult by the flowery style 
of his writing. Although the luxuriant growth of rhetoric 
that is usually found to obscure his real view in most 
places is fortunately not very prominent in the third 
chapter of 'Appearance and Reality*, yet it is present to a 
considerable extent even in this chapter. Anyway, we shall 
try our best to find out the gist of his arguments on re­
lations employed here.
Bradley uses the word 'quality* as a correlative 
of relation in this chapter. It is natural to ask for an 
explanation of this exception to the traditional choice 
of vocabulary. The reason for his so doing is that, having 
disposed of the traditional Aristotelian analysis of things 
into substances and qualities in the second chapter of the
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book, he moves OQ to a phenomena^-ist analysis of things 
into a collection of qualities* He starts his discussion 
of relation in this connection. That is why he makes 
'quality* the correlative of relation.
V/e should now look at the arguments employed in 
this chapter. He argues that relational experience and 
thought are self-contradictory. The contradiction involved 
may be put in a nutshell in the following form. Every 
relation must seek unity of terms, yet if it attains that, 
no relation is possible (since in unity there cannot remain 
any discrete terms to be related). Terms in relation must, 
and yet cannot retain diversity (since if they remain 
absolutely diverse, what effect does relation have on them?) 
Looked at from a different point of view the argument might 
also appear to be directed against the upholders of the 
doctrine of external relations who consider relations and 
terms to be independent of each other. It seems to be 
saying that if you look at them in this way, you are bound 
to get yourself involved in the above contradictions, whereas 
a relatively truer view will be to look at terms as inseparable 
from relations, which is the view recommended by the theory 
of internal relations. We pointed out earlier that according 
to Bradley the very concept of 'relation* itself, whether 
internal or external, is full of contradictions. So the
* 'Qualities' here stands for instances of universels like 
the particular red colour of a red dress which is a unique
^v^r^lTs^like^r^ redness', and not for uni-
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question naturally arises why did he then, so to speak, 
approach one horn of the dilemma rather than the other?
The answer is that according to Bradley the theory of in­
ternal relations is nearer the truth than the theory of 
external relations. If someone points to the curtains of 
my room which are sky blue in colour and asks me 'what 
colour are they?', my answer would definitely be wrong if 
I say 'they are dark blue'. But my answer is at the same 
time nearer the truth than if I say 'they are all red'. 
Similarly, according to Bradley to say that all relations 
are internal is nearer the truth than to say any or some 
are external.
It should be noted here that Bradley is here all 
along working under the impression that terms cannot be 
separated from their relations; relations should be con­
sidered as something 'in' the terms (cf. the etymological 
meaning of the term 'internal')» And one way of considering 
something as 'in* something is definitely provided by the 
analogy of qualities inhering 'in' things. This gives us 
so to speak, the first hint that Bradley is treating relations 
as qualities. %  shall find more hints as we proceed to 
discuss the actual arguments Bradley uses against relations.
The contradiction I put briefly above is actually 
elaborated in four separate arguments by Bradley. Taking 
both relation and quality he seeks first to show that each
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of them is impossible without the other, and then that 
each of them is unintelligible even taken with the other* 
[Bradley here seems to be suggesting the idea that if two 
concepts are both mutually dependent and mutually incompat­
ible, then the two are invalid, or at least invalid when 
used at the same level in the same context; and that if two 
things mutually presuppose one another then also they are 
invalid^
He begins with quality and shows that "Qualities'
1
are nothing without relations". "You can never . . . .
p
find qualities without relations". Whenever we perceive 
qualities, we always perceive many qualities, and manyness 
of qualities implies relation. A multitude of thihgsimust 
have some relations with each other.
Multiplicity or 'plurality* of things "gets for us 
all its meaning through relations."^ Bor there to be a 
plurality the units must each be separate from one another. 
So there must be a relation of difference among many units. 
So everything is related to every other by the relation of 
difference at leqst. As Bradley puts it "if there are no 
differences, there are no qualities, . . . But, if there is
lo Appearance and Reality, B.H.Bradley, 9th impression, 
p. 21.
2, Ibid, p. 22.
3. Ibid, p.22.
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any difference, then that implies a relation."^
Terras taken without relations have no intelligible 
meaning. "Unfortunately, taken together with them, they 
are equally unintelligible."^ "They cannot, in the first 
place, be wholly resolved into the relations."  ^ Because 
then there will remain nothing to be related. So a term, 
for example A, must have some aspect, for example a, on 
the basis of which it can enter into relation with the 
other. All the same, there must be some aspect of it, 
for examples, which results from its being in relation, 
otherwise it could not be said to be related at all. Then 
"Each has a double character, as both supporting and as 
being made by the r e l a t i o n . T h e s e  two aspects are then 
the ground and consequence of the relation. Yet if the 
term in relation has to maintain its unity, its tvfo aspects 
must be combined or related, and then even inside the two 
aspects 'a* and there must appear a diversity of aspects,
the ground and the consequence of the relation. And in this 
way an infinite process of division and sub-division is 
started.
lo Appearance and Reality, p.25»
2. Ibid, p.25.
3. Ibid, p.25.
4» Ibid, p.26.
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In short, if you envisage terms and relations as 
independent of each other, (as those who adhere to the 
externality of relations must do), according to Bradley, 
you are landed in a contradiction. The terms must be, and 
yet cannot be related. If terms are to be united or 
related, they must somehow lose their indépendant characters 
in the relation or unison (cf. there must be some consequence 
of the relation), otherwise how can we say that they are 
united at all; yet they must also have some character not 
wholly resolvable into the unity composed of the terms 
(cf. there must be some ground of the relation). The terms 
in relation must then have two aspects, ground and conse­
quence of relation; and then the problem arises about the 
rdlation between these two characters, which lands us into a 
fresh chain of contradictions.
If we look closely at this argument then it will 
appear that the contradiction which Bradley presents does 
not really arise even in the case of external relations.
If a shoe is larger than another, there must be some feature 
of it which is sufficient to account for its being larger 
in size; and equally there must be some feature of it 
which depends upon its being larger. But Bradley fails 
to detect that these two notions invariably refer to the 
same aspect. It is really the same feature of an object 
which might be viewed from two different points of view.
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It is the exact size of a shoe by virtue of which we call
it larger than another; and at the same time, if it were
not larger than the other, it is its size that would of
necessity be different (assuming the other shoe remained the
same). (I am indebted for this point to Prof. H, Wollheim's
book, *P. H. Bradley*, p. 117)*
Prof. Wollheim suggests that Bradley ignored this
point because of his wrong assimilation of relations to
processes. He treats relation as something that starts
up as a result of some property of an object, and then
under way has some repercussion on that object - thereby
creating another property of the object.
The same dilemma that we have seen to arise in
the case of terms, arises, Bradley shows, even if we start
with relations. "They are nothing intelligible, either
with or 'Without their qualities. In the first place, a
relation without terms seems mere verbiage;"^ "But how
the relation can stand to the qualities is, on the other
2
side, unintelligible," Relations must heLate terms, yet 
this condition of relation cannot be fulfilled, because 
if a relation is to relate its terms, one term in relation
1. Appearance and Reality, p.27»
2. Ibid.
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must be independent of the other, yet if terms retain 
absolute independence, no relation is possible.
The same contradiction might be represented in a 
slightly different form as follows. Every term in relation 
must have independent existence. It is not constituted 
wholly by its relation to the other. It must be independent
of its relation to the other. Yet if it is absolutely
independent'of the relation, it cannot be said to be in 
relation. And we will then require another relation to 
relate the term to the relation. Yet with regard to the
second relation the same contradiction will arise and we
will then be forced to an infinite regress.
Bradley expresses the infinite regress in the 
following way. In order to hold between terms, a relation 
must be something to them. But "in what intelligible way 
will it succeed in being anything to them",^ if it does 
not itself bear a relation to the terms? Thus, there must 
be not only the terms and the relation between them, but also 
a relation between each of the terms and a relation. But 
if this is so, then the same problem is repeated about these 
further subsidiary relations, and we will require further 
relations between them and their terms and so on ad infinitum.
Supposing Bradley meant this argument to be directed
Appearance and Reality, pp. 27-28.
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against the externality of relations, could it then be 
taken as inflicting a serious blow on the doctrine of external 
relations? I do not think so. Bor the difficulty that he 
might have imagined his opponent to be facing does not 
really confront his opponent. Ho relations, whether external 
or internal need to be themselves related to the relata..
A relation simply relates, that is its special capacity, and 
in order to relate its terms, it does not have to be related 
to them. Gum attaches a stamp to an envelope. But in 
order to do that it does not require another thing to attach 
it to the stamp. is to be noted here that there is
another possible interpretation of the argument which, 
however, offers no criticism of relations. Whenever a 
relation relates two or more terms, it avowedly has to its 
terms the relation expressed by saying that it relates them. 
This involves an infinite regress, but undoubtedly a harmless 
one. If we interpret the first part of the locution 'in 
order for a relation to hold between terms it must itself be 
related to them* as stating a prior stipulation, then of 
course the claim becomes dubious, because if relationship 
assumes or presupposes relationship, it is undoubtedly a 
vicious concept. But if the purport of the first part be 
'if a relation relates its terms *, then we are confronted 
with the consequences of relationship, and even if relation­
ship entails relationship infinitely, it does not prove the
57.
3
-X-
The reason why Bradley thinks that relations, in 
order to relate, must be related, is that he is perhaps 
confusing relation with something else. Indeed, it has 
been pointed out by Russell that, "Bradley conceives a 
relation as something just as substantial as its terms, 
and not radically different in kind."^ That is why he is 
troubled by the relation of a relation to the terms it 
relates.
The infinite regress concerned is demonstrated by
Bradley also in the second chapter of 'Appearance and
Reality', where he puts it in the form: "The problem" (of
relation)" is not solved by taking relations as independently
real. Bor, if so, the qualities and their relation fall
entirely apart, « . . Or, we have to make a new relation
between the old relation and the terms; which, when it is
made, does not help us. It . . .  . itself demands a new
2
relation . . ." Relations should not, according to Bradley, 
be considered 'inc^endently ', they should not 'fall apart' 
from their terms, they should not be 'between' the terms.
1. An Outline of Philosophy, B. Russell, (London, 1927), 
p.263.
2. Appearance and Reality, p.18.
* I am indebted for the remarks put inside the square
brackets to Prof. Wollheim. See Wollheim*s *B.H.Bradley *, 
pp. 115-116.
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Does he not seem to be suggesting that like qualities they 
should not be 'independent ' of the thing; they should not 
'fall apart* from the things of which they are qualities; 
but should inhere 'in' the things?
Bradley's being influenced by the false analogy 
between a relation and a quality is betrayed by the language 
he adopts in many places of the third chapter of 'Appearance 
and Reality*. Everything, we have seen him to be asserting, 
is related to every other thing by the relation of difference 
at least. Difference according to him is a relation. This 
difference, he argues, must fall either outside the things 
v/hich are different, or it must fall inside a thing. But 
if it falls inside a thing, then tie maintains, it "separates 
each" thing "into two qualities in relation."^
The difficult situation in which Bradley imagines 
the adherent of the theory of external relation to be 
exists, if at all, only because of a misconception of the 
nature of relations. This confusion between a relation and 
a quality is also evident in those writings of his where he 
explicitly fights against the theory of external relations 
in order to make room for the relatively truer doctrine of 
internal relations. Let us therefore turn our attention to 
those writings. As I have said before, there is mainly one
lo Appearance and Reality, p.24.
59.
source of his demurrer against external relations, Appendix 
B of 'Appearance and Reality." The unfinished essay entitled 
'Relations * and several places of the 'Essays on Truth and 
Reality* also provide some demurrer against the theory.
Y/e shall begin with the Appendix B.
Bradley deals with the question, "Are qualities
and in general are terms altered necessarily by the relations
into which they enter?"^ And the implication of the phrase
'alter necessarily* seems to be that in the absence of the
relations the terms would be necessarily different. He
takes it for granted that relations are qualities. "Our
question", he writes, "does not ask if terms are in any
sense whatever qualified by their relations* For everyone
2
. . . admits this in some sense, . . ." And he understands 
the externalists to maintain that the absence of a relation 
makes n_q difference to the terms. It becomes then easy 
for him to deny the externality of relations, since there 
does not appear to be much reason for calling some qualities 
of partioular things their qualities and not other things *, 
if their presence or absence makes no difference to the things *
1. Appearance and Reality, pp. 513-514
2. Ibid, p. 514.
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"At first sight", Bradley agrees, "obviously such
external relations seem possible . . . They seem given to
us, . . . i n  change of spatial position and again also
in comparison."^ But if relations such as these make
no difference to the terms, he asks " ,/hat is the meaning
and sense of qualifying the terms by it? If in short it
is external to the terms, how can it possibly be true of 
2
them?" In fact, if the absence of some qualities of X 
and Y makes _no difference to X and Y at all, why should we say 
at all that they are qualities of X and Y; v/hy should we say 
that the propositions ascribing those qualities to X and Y 
a_e true of X and Y? But not only is Bradley misrepresent­
ing the nature of relations by taking them to be qualities, 
he is misrepresenting the contention of the externalists 
in another respect also. He understands externalists to 
suggest that the alteration of spatial positions etc. 
makes no difference at all to the things. But in fact what 
the externalist wohld assert is not that the change of 
spatial position implies no change of any property of the 
things at all; of course it implies a change of property.
But it does not imply a change of the essential properties 
of things. ,/e will explain our contention more fully on
-X"
another occasion later in this chapter.
* See page 65 »
1. Appearance and Reality, p.514»
2. Ibid.
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So far we have shown that Bradley construed a 
relation as a qua.lity of the things it relates. But now 
I want to show how Bradley misconceived relation not only 
as qualifying the terms related, but also as qualifying the 
situation in which it occurs*
In some places Bradley explicitly says that 
relations are characteristics or qualities of relational 
wholes. Relations are, according to him, impossible outside 
a totality or unity. "Relations are unmeaning except within
and on the basis of a substantial whole",^ "does not a relation
2
imply an underlying unity and an inclusive whole?" "Both" 
(relation and immediate experience) "are alike in being ways 
that hold a diversity in u n i t y . " H o w  the experienced 
relational situation must - to speak loosely - be viewed as
A
a whole which has parts*" Bradley's point is not just 
that relations are always to be found inside unities or wholes, 
but is rather that they are 'of' wholes, or are qualities of 
wholes* They qualify wholes composed of terms, and not 
terms in their supposed individuality. "Certainly every 
content and aspect of the relational situation as an exper­
ienced fact may and must be taken as qualifying in some sense
1 * Appearance and Reality, p. 125»
2. Essays on Truth and Reality, Bradley, p.193
3. Collected Essays, Bradley, p* 634*
4* Ibid, p* 636.
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the situation as a whole ; "the relations themselves
dannot exist except within and as the adjectives of an
2
underlying unity," .... ." a relation is unmeaning, unless 
both itself and the relateds are the adjectives of a 
whole c"^
Now whatever might be the merits of Bradley *s 
arguments about the internality of relations in other 
respects, we cannot, in any way, allow this misrepresentation 
of the nature of relations, i.e., representation of relations 
as qualities. we have already hinted briefly at the
Impossibility of taking relations as qualities in the
•X’
previous chapter, although we did not make there the 
distinction between treating a relation as a quality of the 
relational situation or of the related terms * Following 
Russell we can now point out particularly, that, there is 
no possible way igi which we can treat at least asymmetrical 
relations as qualities of the relational complex* Take the 
case of the relation between two people, X who is 20 years 
old, and Y who is 19 years old. The proposition ‘X is older 
than Y ', it might be suggested, asserts of the whole composed 
by them viz. (][Y), that *(XY) contains diversity of age*.
1. Collected Essays, Bradley, p.636.
2. Appearance and Reality, p.512.
3# Ibid, p.394»
* See pages 26-29»
** Principles of Mathematics, B.Mussell, pp.224-226.
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But such a proposition cannot be said to give us the 
entire fact about the relational complex. Bor such a 
whole (XY) must be different from another whole where Y 
is older than X and whichimight be represented in the form 
(YX)c And this distinction cannot be explained in any way 
save by reference to the relation of the components X and Y, 
where X stands in the relation of 'older than* to Y. Bor 
(][Y) and (YX) consist of precisely the same parts; their 
difference lies solely in the fact that 'older than* is, 
in the first case, a relation of X to Y, in the second, a 
relation of Y to X.
Neither can relations be viewed as qualities of the 
relata. In showing the impossibility of such a treatment
•it
of relations we shall once again follow Russell. The 
advocate of treating relations as qualities will probably say 
that the proposition *X is greater than Y * embodies two 
propositions, each imputing a certain property to X and Y 
respectively, the putative qualities being the magnitudes 
of X and Y. But these propositions will not, in that 
case, give the whole meaning expressed by the proposition 
*X is greater than Y *. In order to convey that meaning 
he will be forced to sa^  ^ *X's magnitude is greater than that
* Principles of Mathematics, B. Russell, p.222
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of Y* and thus he will fail to get rid of the relation of
greater and less which he attempted to do away with,
Bradley brings out a number of objections against
externality and also a number of arguments in favour of
internality of relations in the Appendix B referred to above.
But in fact he seems to be directing his effort mainly
towards demolishing the foundations of the opposite view
rather than towards trying to construct a new/building
(as of course one would expect in view of his total opposition
to relations in Chapter III of'Appearance and Reality),
Take for example the insufficiency he tries to demonstrate
in the position of an externalist. He says that "the
terms" and their external "relations, do not by themselves
include all the f a c t s , e v e r y  relational complex implies
a whole.' "In various respects" this "whole has a character
• . . which cannot be shown to consist barely in mere terms
2
and mere relations between them." Take for example the 
relation between a table and a chair which is to the left 
of it. This relational complex cannot be expressed merely 
by the terms *the table* and *the chair* and the relation 
of being *to the left of*. If this arrangement is altered, 
and the table is placed to the left of the chair, the relat­
ional complex acquires a new property. And of what, if not
1, Appearance and Reality, p.515
2. Ibid, p. 515*
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of the terms can we predicate this quality? "to predicate 
this new result barely of the external relations seems,
. . . impossible,"^ So far as the relation 'being to the 
left of* is concerned; this relation cannot be said to 
have changed. But this problem does not really compel the 
externalist to give up his stand-point* He can simply say 
that the change of position has invested the table and the 
chair with new properties, viz., the table now acquires the 
property *to the left of the chair* and the chair the 
property 'to the right of the table *. But such a change 
does not necessarily change the table and the chair.
If the acquiring of these properties altered the essential 
properties of the table and the chair, then only they 
might be thought to have changed necessarily.
This brings us to a very central notion of Bradley *s 
arguments against the externality of relations. He would 
say that the reason why we think that such a change has not 
necessarily altered them is that we identify the things 
with certain general characteristics like 'table* and 'chair'; 
we think of them as of certain kinds, we refer to them only 
as instances of certain universals, so that whatever changes 
they might have undergone they still remain table and chair.
But to think of them as 'table * and 'chair' or as Bradley calls
1, Appearance and Reality, p,515»
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it, as 'characters’ is to start with "premises" which
"were not true or real," and which will give us a wrong
conclusion, viz., that change of relations does not change
the things themselves. If on the other hand you take the
particular things not as 'characters' but as concrete existing
things or as "existences", then you will be bound to regard
the position of the externalist as false. Thus we see
*
Bradley arguing: "But an important if obvious distinction
seems here overlooked. For a thing may remain unaltered 
if you identify it with a certain character, , . . If, . • . 
you take a billiard ball and a man in abstraction from 
place, they will of course . . .  be indifferent to changes 
of place. But . . . neither of them, if regarded so, is 
a thing which actually exists; each is more or less a 
valid abstraction. But take them as existing things and 
take them without mutilation, and you must regard them as 
determined by their places and qualified by the whole 
material system into which they enter. . . . The billiard 
ball, . . .  if taken apart from its place . . .  in the whole, 
is not an existence but a character, and that character 
can remain unchanged, though the existing thing is altered
1. Appearance and Reality, Bradley, p.521.
* Italics used in this quotation are mine.
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with its changed existence,
A number of interesting issues are imbedded in this 
passage which we must consider to a certain extent. In the 
first place, what does Bradley mean by 'taking'? Does he 
mean by it 'thinking of'? If so, how else can we think 
of a thing except by catching it up in a mesh of universais,
by thinking of it as of a certain kind?
It is true that in our experience things appear 
to us as qualified by a number of characteristics simult­
aneously, e.g., the table appears in our experience as being 
something of a certain sort, of a particular shape, size, 
colour, as occupying a certain space and so on. As Prof, 
V/ollheim shows in his book on Bradley, according to Bradley,
"Things are, and come to us as, wholes ; and to understand
2them we must understand them as wholes." v/hat we on the 
other hand in our thought do is to carve off a part of a 
whole which is a collection of properties, say the abstract 
universal 'table* of which a particular table is an instance,
and refer to this whole by means of this single property
'table * and thus get ourselves involved in abstraction. In 
this way Bradley tries to condemn thought and reasoning in 
order to make room for immediate experience, and says that
1. Appearance and Reality, Bradley, p.517,
2. P.H.Bradley, R.Wollheim, p.109,
68,
thought can give us only partial or relative truth. But 
actually this condemnation of thought is illegitimate.
Because his statement that 'thought can give us only partial 
or relative truth' then would lead to a peculiar self-refuting 
position. If every piece of reasoning confines us only in 
partial truth, then even the reasoning that every piece of 
reasoning gives us partial truth itself becomes only partially 
true,* He can thus condemn reasoning only at the cost of 
defeating his own position.
Anyway, the whole theory of external relations, 
according to Bradley's analysis, turns out to be based on 
vicious abstractions. Why do we after all have to consider 
the sheet of paper on which I am writing to have in itself 
remained the identical sheet even though it has been smeared 
all over with writing? Is it not due to a prejudice in us 
of distinguishing between essential and accidental or external 
properties of things? There is not in fact any absolute 
and objective distinction between 'intrinsical' or essential 
and 'external' or inessential properties. This distinction 
is really the result of abstraction from actual existences 
by thought, the result of identifying a thing with an 
'identical character'. Such an abstraction might be useful 
yet it cannot possess absolute validity. In fact, "Every­
* V/e shall speak about a similar point on the treatment 
of partial truths on p,
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thing other than this identical character may be called 
relatively external . . , absolutely external it cannot 
be."^ He says, "for a limited purpose, you can divide 
your individual term, and take one part as what you call 
'essential'. And so far as this division is made, the 
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic relations will 
hold. Whenever that part of your term which you select 
as its essence remains outside of some relation, . . . the 
relation so far is extrinsic. And . . . where the entrance 
of the term includes, , . , the essence also as in one with 
the whole term, the relation here is intrinsic. But no
2
such distinction, . . . can have more than relative validity."
A relational property like 'being smeared with writing by 
me' is just as essential as the property 'being a sheet of 
paper' is. At this point we ought to remind ourselves of 
our discussion in the previous chapter of the Aristotelian 
treatment of essence and accident, and on his insistence on 
treating relations as accidents, We have tried to show that 
our regarding certain qualities as essential to certain 
classes or things does not depend merely on our subjective 
and arbitrary selection. Hence it seems possible to make an 
objective distinction between essential and non-essential 
qualities of things. V/e shall now try to show the
1. Appearance and Reality, Bradley, pp. 517-518
2. Collected Essays, Bradley, pp. 645-646,
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impossibility involved in Bradley's claim about tolling
relations or relational properties as es,.ences, (I use
this disjunction here, because when philosophers speak of
relations being essential they often mean that relational
properties of things are essential to them. Of. Moore's
Comment quoted below).
That Bradley held relational properties of things
also to be essential is evident from some such remarks of
his as the following, where he tries to explain what he
#-
means by all relations being internal, "a relation must
at both ends affect, and pass into, the being of its terms.
"Qvery relation, . . . essentially penetrates the being of
2its terms, and, in this sense, is intrinsical;" "qualities
\k  «^ e.rvejr«:»A. 3
1^0 . teitms ... g» altered necessarily by the relations." 
Similar remarks are made by Joachim in his book 'The Nature
of Truth’: " All relations ’qualify' or 'modify ’ or 'make
" ** 
a difference 'to the terms between which they hold. ’
Now it is not easy to make out what these state­
ments signify. ' Yet one sense of such statements is that 
relations are essential to the terms. A similar suggestion 
is made by Moore in his essay, 'External and Internal 
Relations', where he tries to give a certain interpretation
1. Appearance and Reality, p.322.
2. Ibid, p.347»
ÇU-
3» Ibid, p.|514*
k  Italics in these ciuotations are mine.
of Truth, H.Joachim, p.i2; Itgiics
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of the above statements. He rightly observes that 'philo­
sophers who talk of relations being internal, often actually 
mean by 'relations* 'relational properties'."^ Reflecting 
on the use of expressions like 'affect', 'modify', he remarks 
that part of the meaning of expressions like 'all relations 
modify their terms ' is that "In the case of every relational 
property which a thing has, it is always true that the thing 
v.hich has it would have been different if it had not had that 
property; jjlnd this might have been suggested by some
such cases as where the possession of a relational property
like 'being held in the flame ' actually modifies a thing
like a 'sealing-wax'. V/e can say that the sealing-wax
would not have been in a melted state if it had not been 
in the flame. Now it is to be kept in mind that the case 
cited here is a case of causal efficacy; it does not 
establish a metaphysical point. Yet I think that the meta­
physical doctrine might have been suggested by a case like 
this^ The above statement might again be piit in the form 
that ' -"in the case of every relational property, it can 
always be truly asserted of any term A which has that 
property, that any term which had not had it would necessarily 
have been different from A." And such a statement might,
1. Philosophical Studies, G.E.Hoore, 1922, p.282.
2o Ibid, p* 283*
3. Ibid, p.284.
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according to Moore, be said to express the dogma of internal 
relations.
Moore rightly discerns a sense of logical implication 
in phrases like 'would necessarily have been'. This phrase 
is linked in meaning to 'follow from*. For example, one 
way of saying with regard to properties P and Q that any 
term which had had P would necessarily have had Q, is 'from 
the proposition with regard to any given term that it has 
P, it follows that the term has Q.' Thus according to 
the dogma of internal relations the terms of a relation 
must under all circumstances have it. With regard to any 
relational property P, the proposition *A has P* becomes 
a necessary proposition. And one way of expressing the 
fact that a certain property P is essential to a thing A 
is surely that the proposition 'A has P ' is a necessary one.
Moore objects to such a dogma by saying that, in 
the case of many relational properties, the fact that the 
things have them is a mere matter of fact. "it seems . . . 
evident in many cases", writes Moore, "that a term which 
has a certain relational property, might quite well not have 
had it: that, for instance, from the mere proposition that
this is this, it by no means follows that this has to other 
things all the relations which it in fact has."^ Thus it
1. Philosophical Studies, G.E.Moore, p.306.
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cannot be said with regard to every relational property 
that the proposition asserting that a thing has it, is a 
necessary proposition.
Moore says that it may be true that A has P, and 
yet it is not true that from the proposition that a thing 
has not got P it follows that the thing is other than A.
But he thinks that the reason for disputing this fact is 
that it is in fact true that if A has P, and X has not, it
does follow that X is other than A. He maintains that
the internalists confuse with one another two propositions 
one of which he admits to be true, viz., (l) that if A 
has P, and X has not, it does follow that X is other than A, 
and the other which he maintains to be false, viz., (2) that 
if A has P, then from the proposition with regard to any 
term X that it has not got P, it follows that X is other
than A. It is a mistake, he thinks, to suppose that
proposition (2)gfollows from proposition (l).
Moore tries to show precisely that proposition 
(2) does not follow from proposition (l) with the help of 
certain symbolic devices. He puts the true proposition 
with which the internalists are confusing the dogma of 
internal relations, viz. (l) that if anything has a relational 
property and another thing has not, it does follow that 
the latter is other than the former, into symbolic form as 
follows (taking Pasarelational property):
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^ "Abat we assert of P when we say - 
XP entails ^YP (Y = X)^
can be truly asserted of every relational property."
In the same way, i.e., by taking P as a relational 
property, he symbolises the dogma of internal relations (2), 
that if any term has any relational property then from the 
proposition with regard to any term that it has not got the 
relational property it follows that the latter term is other 
than the former term, as follows :
( o)' "What we assert of P when we say*
XP * entails (Y = X)^
can be truly predicated of every relational property."
We must stop here a little to explain two of 
the symbols used above, namely, 'entails' and In
the first place, *p entails q ' means 'q follows from p'. 
Secondly, by putting the symbol between two propositions, 
for example, p and q, as in 'p * q ', we briefly express the 
proposition that 'It is not the case both that p is true 
and q is false.'
That (2) does not follow from (4) can, Moore says, 
be seen as follows. It can follow from (l), if from any 
proposition of the form 'p entails (q * r)' the proposition 
*P * (q entails r ) * can follow. And that it does not follow
75-
can be seen by considering the following three propositions;
(a) 'All students in the degree course are more 
than 18 years of age.'
(b) ‘The young boy who lives in the other flat
is a student in the degree course.'
(c) ‘The young boy who lives in the other flat
is more than 18 years of age. *
We can surely maintain that (a )here does absolutely 
entail (b * c). It absolutely follows from (a) that 
‘The young boy who lives in the other flat is a student 
in the degree course ‘ and ‘The young boy who lives in the 
other flat is not more than 18 years of age‘, are not, as 
a matter of fact, both true. But it by no means follows 
from this that ?a * (b entails c)‘. For what this latter 
proposition means is “It is not the case both that *a* is 
true and that (b entails c) ‘ is false", And, as a matter 
of fact, ‘(b entails c) * is quite certainly false. From 
the proposition (b) "The young boy . . , student in the 
degree course" the proposition (c) "The young boy . . .  18 
years of age" does not follow. It is, therefore, clearly 
not the case that every proposition of the form ‘p entails 
(q * r ) ‘ entails the corresponding proposition of the form 
*p * (q entails r) *.
A similar line of attack against the view that 
all relations are internal seems to be pursued by Prof,
76c
Ayer in a paper which he read in a symposium on ‘Internal 
relations', which is published in the Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, 1935? Supplementary volume XIV.
He says in that paper that the claim of an internalist to 
the effect that, ‘if A has the relational property P, then 
anytning which has not got ? is necessarily other than A ‘ 
is simply another way of asserting that ‘the proposition 
"A has P" is analytic. ‘ And one feature of analytic 
propositions is surely that such propositions are necessary 
ones. We find Prof. Ayer saying "And now we may state the 
dogma of internal relations . . . We find that to assert 
that all relations are internal to their terms is equivalent 
to asserting with regard to any relational proposition that 
if it is true then it rs^ analytic." He finds it not very 
difficult to show that this is false, since in order to do 
that "we have only to produce examples of relational propo­
sitions which may very well be true,without being analytically 
2
true," For instance, it is in fact true that I am now 
perceiving a piece of paper, and that the sofa in my room 
is in front of the fire-place. But none of these true 
propositions is analytic, "Although false, it is not self­
contradictory to say that I am not now perceiving a piece of
1, P.A.S. 1935, Supplementary volume XIV, p.175»
2. Ibid, p.175.
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paper, or that the sofa in my room is not in front of the 
fire-place^"^
It might now be objected by Bradley that the reason 
why it is considered that a proposition asserting ‘A has P ’, 
where P is a relational property, is not a necessary one ia 
that you are characterising a thing by a certain abstract 
universal like 'human being' or 'sofa*, whereas in reality 
these things are characterised 'by the whole material system 
into which they enter* without reference to which they 
become abstractions. But I do not think that such a demurrer 
is a valid one, because the basis of Bradley's objection is 
itself controversial. He holds that reality is one; 
multiplicity is, roughly speaking, aspects of this unique 
Reality. Therefore between different elements of the 
universe there is a necessary connection, so much so that 
you cannot take away any element of it apart from the others. 
But the type of Monism that Bradley advocates 
cannot be supposed to be above criticism. He tries to 
explain the apparent multiplicity of the world with the 
help of the famous principle of 'identity in difference', 
V/ithout this the monist cannot give any satisfactory account 
of the world. Yet the principle of identity in difference 
is impossible if we adhere to Monism, The reason is that
1. P.A.S. 1935 Supplementary volume XIV, p.175.
78
such a principle involves many partial truths, which combine 
into one whole of truth. But in strict Monism partial 
truths are not only not quite true; they cannot even be 
true at all (or false, for that matter). The ironist claims 
that they are * partly true'. But in order even to 'be 
partly true* they must 'wholly subsist', which is impossible 
according to Bradley an Monism, as that would create, a 
plurality. Hence there cannot be any partial truths on a 
monistic view.
Je see then that Bradley's monistic position is 
not above criticism. But since this monistic position is 
the basis of the objection that Bradley is raising here, 
there arises doubt as to the validity of the objection 
itself o
Apparent externality of relations is, according 
to Bradley, due only to our ignorance, our short-sightedness 
so to speai:. All relations are necessary. None can be 
mere conjunctions. We might think that a particular quality 
like red-hairedness is absolutely indifferent to its relations. 
Red-hairedness might appear in different people of different 
ages, different sexes and different states of health. It 
has therefore relations with all these different character­
istics. But none of these relations are essential to it.
For could we not know red-hai±edness without knowing these 
things? Bradley's answer to this is that although we do
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have some knowledge of red-hairedness, we do not have full 
knowledge of it. Red-hairedness is an integral part of an 
organism and is indeed so bound up, for example, with the 
structure of hair-fibres, and this in turn with all manner 
of constitutional factors determining racial and individual 
differences, that our notion of it supplies us with an ex­
tremely meagre acquaintance with it. Full knowledge of 
red-hairedness would, in fact, involve knowing the entire 
universe. It is only bedause of ignorance that we think 
that we know red-hairedness without knowing all the relations 
of red-hairedness with all these characteristics. "if you 
could have a perfect relational knowledge of the world, . . . 
you could from the nature of red-hairedness reconstruct all 
the red-haired men. In such perfect knowledge you could 
start internally from any one character in the Universe, and 
you could from that pass to the rest
But here again, as we have shown a little while 
ago, Bradley is basing his case on something which is highly 
controversial. Different elements of the universe are, 
according to him, aspects of the one Reality, so that you 
cannot know any one element fully unless you know the rest 
of the universe. But as we have shown a little while ago, 
Bradley's monistic position cannot be held to be above
Appearance and Reality, Bradley, p.520.
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criticism. Hence since Bradley bases this objection on his 
monistic position, we come to doubt the validity of the 
objection.
Moreover, according to Bradley, nothing short of 
knov;ing the entire universe would amount to ’fully knowing ’ 
anything. But then he will be led to a self-defeating
position. Because if everything other than knowing the
entire universe amounts to partial knowledge, then even this 
piece of knowledge would also be ’partial knowledge’. And 
we will then not even ’know fully’ that there is such a 
thing as 'full knov/ledge*.
Bradley employs several relatively less strong 
arguments for internality of relations, not all of which do 
I want to consider here because of lack of space. I do not 
think that any of these arguments possess any great strength. 
(Neither do I think that even the combination of them can 
have much force, because these different arguments do not 
appear to supplement one another.)
An example of such relatively unimportant arguments 
is the following. Whenever there is a relation there is a 
whole or unity. "And, where the whole is different, the 
terms that qualify it . . . must so far be different, and so 
far therefore by becoming elements in a fresh unity the 
terms must be altered."^ Now it is true that when we have a 
physical whole like a chair, its parts might be said to
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constitute a unity. If the whole is altered and we 
construct a table out of the parts of this chair, the parts 
undergo considerable changes. The arms are converted into 
legs of the table, the seat to its top. The arms then 
would no longer remain arms nor the seat the seat. Now 
it seems doubtful whether such changes could be considered 
to be essential changes of the things related. Although 
the conversion of the seat of a chair into the top of a 
table is a considerable change (since the seat can no longer 
be called a 'seat'), it seems controversial v/hether it could 
be regarded as an essential change of the things related.
It all seems to depend on how you choose to describe the
things related. If you describe the objects related as the
'seat of a chair* or as the *top of a table* then of course 
such a conversion might be regarded as an essential change. 
If on the other hand you describe the things as 'pieces of 
wood', then you can hardly call such a conversion an 
essential change.
And I wonder, if all relational complexes could 
be said to make wholes or unities. Where, for example, 
is the unity in a relation of difference between a pen and 
a pencil? Bradley might of course try to defend his case 
by saying that the pencil and the pen cannot be considered
to be different at all if they do not have unity in some
respect such as both being used for purposes of writing.
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But I wonder what the point of unityibetween a. pen and 
an abstract quality like kindness might conceivably be! 
Perhaps it will be said that the point of unity consists
in the fact that they are both thought of by me. Now such
a unity will be found between any pair of things that I
care to select. And undoubtedly some artificiality is
associated with this conception of unity. How, for Bradley, 
do I manage to unite the pen and kindness by the relation 
'being thought about by me* unless they already each stand 
in some common unity with me (so that I can be in the 
relation 'thinking about* with respect to them) and so with 
each other?
But even if we admit unity in every relational
situation, there is still room for doubt whether Bradley's
claim that 'by becoming elements in a fresh unity the
*
terms must be altered' is a valid one. Two pencils which 
are both red have a unity as regards their colour. Now 
one of them might become an element of a fresh unity, when 
for example the second pencil is cut so that the first 
pencil comes, without itself changing, to have the same 
size as the second, Here then we have a case of unity 
where one of the terms forming the unity does not necessarily 
alter by becoming an element of a fresh unity. The same 
term may become an element of one unity in one respect, 
and of another in another.
* See bottom of page #) r ^nd of first paragr^P^ p. 81.
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Perhaps this looks like begging the question 
against Bradley. He would perhaps insist that by becoming 
an element in a fresh unity a term necessarily changes.
But I fail to understand in which respect the particular 
pencil of which I am speaking can be said to have changed!
Has it been completely changed into something else? Has 
it altered in respect of its shape, or colour or size?
Perhaps it will be said that the change is in the follov;ing 
respect: in one case I am thinking of the pencil as having
the same colour as another, in the other I .am thinking of it 
as having the same size as another. But then the difference 
would lie in my thought only, not in the object of which I 
am thinking.
Bradley tries to exploit the alleged unity involved 
in relational situations as a weapon against the externalists 
in other places in his writings. He seems to say g-I' , 
that if you start with discrete units merely, how can a 
collection of them produce a unity? Take for example the 
passage in the essay, 'Relations*; "And from terms taken 
as in themselves unrelated, and from a relation not taken as 
itself their relation,,there is no logical way to the union 
. . . required for, the relational fact. . . . Or, to regain 
this, Y\re may fa^l back blindly on a form of experience which 
in its essence is not relational."^ As remarked just now.
1. Collected Essays, Bradley, p.64?.
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I cannot see the necessity of regarding all relational 
situations as unities. And I think that Bradley's effort 
to seek unity in every relational situation is an effect of 
his trying to construct the relational situation on the 
model of 'immediate experience' or 'feeling'. My first 
objection to such a view is that I do not see the necessity 
of viewing the relational situation on the model of feeling. 
Secondly, there are of course indivisible unities between 
relata in certain relational situations, as for example 
in the relation between a part to the whole which unity 
might be said to imply the internality of the relation 
concerned in some sense, although not in an absolute sense.* 
But this does not establish an indivisible unity in every 
relational situation, and hence the problem of recreating 
such a unity out of discrete units does not appear in all 
spheres.
We have made a long critical survey of Bradley's 
views on relations. During the course of this survey we 
have tried to show in various ways that his arguments 
against external relations and for internal relations do not 
stand the test of criticisms. We have also tried to show 
that tv/o of the very important views Bradley holds with 
regard to relations, namely, that relations belong to the 
essences of things and that they qualify the things or the 
relational situations, are completely wrong. Pluraliste
* See my discussion of this topic on p. 120 below.
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who support the externality of relations have tried time 
and again to point to the falsity of these views. Explicit 
formulations of the pluralist's views that relations do not 
always belong to the essences of things and that they are 
not qualities of anything can be found in the writings of 
contemporary philosophers like Moore, Ayer and Russell,
But the origins of these views can be traced as far back 
as the writings of the philosophers of the earliest times 
like Aristotle,
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CH AFTER III 
SOME OTHER AuCUMENTS ON INTERNAL RELATIONS
We have made an extensive study of Bradley’s 
arguments for the internality of all relations in the 
preceding chapter. V/e have done that with a particular 
object in mind. We have remarked there that Bradley is 
the chief exponent of the doctrine of internal relations. 
Many leading idealists down from the nineteenth century 
to the present day have been greatly influenced by Bradley's 
arguments and supported the doctrine of internal relations 
with arguments similar to his. So we examined Bradley’s 
arguments in some detailvith the hope that we would be
in a good position to refute the doctrine of internal
relations if we can refute Bradley's arguments on the inter­
nality of relations.
In the present chapter we shall have a look at 
some of the main arguments employed by philosophers other 
than Bradley in support of the doctrine of internal 
relations and try to see whether we can refute them. In
the course of our study of these arguments we shall try to
show that a great majority of them are essentially similar 
to Bradley's arguments and that the same objections that 
apply to his arguments apply to them also, while there are
8'I »
a few other arguments which have a more independent character 
and demand separate treatment. Our programme in examining 
these arguments will hence be twofold; (I) examining those 
arguments which are essentially similar to Bradley's 
arguments, and (II) examining the more original ones. 
Accordingly I propose to make two sections, the first of
-X"
which will deal with the first part of the programme, and 
the second with the second.
Section I
In this section we shall start with some of 
Joachim's arguments as we find them in his 'The Nature of 
Thought'. He says, " . . .  a purely external relation is 
in the end meaningless and i m p o s s i b l e . T o  admit a 
relation to be external is, according to him, to make a 
relation a kind of third thing separate from the two relata. 
And if a relation is a thing, it will itself need to be 
related to the things which are independent of it. This 
argument is very close to the argument Bradley employs in 
the third chapter of 'Appearance end Reality' in order to 
demonstrate the infinite regress involved in taking relations
lo The Nature of Thought, H. Joachim, p. 11.
* There will be an obvious exception to this programme.
For reasons that will be explained later on p.89 
we shall consider one argument of independent character 
in Section I.
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as fully real which we have discussed on page. 5 2 
of our second chapter. 7e rust remember our remark in the 
last chapter* that although this argument is primarily 
directed against the reality of all relations, yet we can 
find here an embig onic form of the argument against the 
externality of relations which ia later developed more 
fully in many places of 'Appearance and Reality'. Hence 
it could be regarded in some sense as an argument against 
the externality of relations and we shall do well to note 
the similarity of this argument to the argument Joachim 
uses against the externality of relations (although Joachim 
did not believe relations to be unreal). Bradley argues 
there that in order to hold between terms a relation must 
be something to them. But if it is to be anything to them 
iti. must itself bear a relation to the terms. And then the 
second relation will also have to be related to the first 
and so on ad infinitum.
Like Bradley Joachim also takes relations to be 
qualities of the terns. He says that he does not maintain 
that every relation is nothing but the adjectives of its 
terms. But he maintains that "every relation at least 
qualifies its terms, and is so far an adjective of them,
* See pages 47-48.
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even if it be also something besides."^"
He argues that "so far as A and B ai'-e related,
they are eo ipso interdependent features of something other
2
than either of them singly: This reminds us of Bradley's
insistence on the presence of a unity and a whole in every 
case of relation, which admission is impossible if relation 
is taken to be external. Internalists seem here to be 
pointing out to the externalists that you cannot obtain 
the indivisible unity present in every relational complex 
with the sole help of discrete units which are not by their 
very nature united.
I am afraid we will only bore the reader with 
repetitions if we try to assess the validity of the kind 
of arguments quoted above after all we have said in the 
previous chapter.
Bosanquet has given another quite interesting 
argument for the internality of all relations in his 'Logic' 
which argument, though it has got a more or less independent 
character, we want to discuss in Section I for the reason 
that in Section II we want to discuss those independent 
arguments which form themselves into a definite kind into 
which kind the present argument cannot be fitted. He says
1. The Nature of Thought, H.Joachim, pp. 11-12
2. Ibid, p.12.
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that all relations are internal in the sense that they are
all "grounded in the nature of the related terms."^ He
prefers the phrase 'relevant relations' by which he means
"relations which are connected with the properties of their
terms, so that any alteration of relations involves an
2
alteration of properties and vice versa," Now it is not 
very clear what Bosanquet means by all this. But he seems 
to mean something like the following.
It seems impossible to conceive that a relation 
could relate its terms if it were not somehow rooted in their 
nature. As he explains, "In a large proportion of cases 
the relevancy of the relations to the properties of the 
related terms involves a community of kind. You cannot 
have a spatial relation between terms which are not in space. 
You cannot have a moral relation between terms which are 
not members of a moral world."  ^ In all cases the properties 
of the terms are relevant to the relations in which they 
stand to each other. There is undoubtedly some truth in 
his contention. For a relation to occur at all a necessary, 
though not always a sufficient, condition of its occurrence 
must be found in the properties of the terms. In the case
1. Logic, B. Bosanquet, p.277
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid, pp. 277-278.
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of mathematical relations like 'half* and 'double*, the 
nature of the terms is a sufficient as well as necessary 
condition of the appearance of the relations. That 4 is 
half of 3 follows solely from the nature of the terms 
themselves. In the case of a relation like spatial con­
tiguity of a book to a table, some of the properties of 
the terms form the necessary condition of its appearance. 
Because it is a book therefore it can be kept on a table.
An abstract quality like kindness cannot be kept on a table.
But even if we grant that there is some truth in 
the contention of these internalists that relations are 
grounded in the nature of the terms or that the qualities 
of the terms are relevant to their relations, this does not 
by itself prove that the relations are internal in every 
case in the sense that the terms eould not be what they are 
if the relations were different. The former could prove 
the latter if the nature of the terms were in every case 
the sufficient as well as the necessary condition of the 
appearance of the relation. (Wo hovo alroad-y noted this
n n tho^econdi ohQp-t'Qr) » If P and Q have the qualities 
a and b, and if they are related by viftue of a and b and by 
virtue of a and b only, then we could say that if they are 
not so related, they do not have the qualities a and b.
Bosanquet*s opinion regarding the internality of 
relations ia very well summed up in the following quotation
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from bis ’Logic*, "Relations are true of their terms. They 
express their positions in complexes, which positions elicit 
their behaviour, their self-maintenance in the world of 
t h i n g s o T h e  first sentence of the quotation appears to 
be implying that if the relations are purely external, 
we cannot sensibly speak of them as true of their terms.
If the terms are not related by virtue of their own nature, 
then a proposition asserting such a relation cannot be true 
of the terms. To say that relations (or more properly 
speaking propositions asserting relations) are true of the 
things related, is to say that they are not made true by us. 
In fact truth is truth irrespective of v/hether anyone ack­
nowledges it as true or not. And he appears to be arguing 
that the relations which are true of any terms are made true 
by the nature of the terms themselves and are therefore 
internal to them. (Of. Bradley's remarks: "If in short"
a relation "is external to the terms, how can it possibly 
be true of them? To put the same tning otherwise, if we 
merely make the conclusion, is that conclusion a true one?" ) 
But, as a matter of fact, all we can say from the fact that 
relations are true of the terms is that relations are 
grounded in the nature of the terms. And as remarked just
1. Bosanquet, Logic, p.278.
2. Appearance and Reality, Bradley, p.514»
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now, we cannot pass from this to the conclusion that in the 
absence of any given relations the terms would always be 
altered essentially.
The second sentence of the quotation also cannot 
establish the internality of relations.
It is true that in every case of relation there is 
a complex and the terms in relation sometimes occupy a 
peculiar position in it, such that if that particular 
position is altered, the properties of the relata undergo 
some changes, Bosanquet seems to be influenced here con­
siderably by Bradley's insistence (which we considered in 
the middle of the second chapter) that we will have a 
different relational complex if we change the sense of the 
relation. Hence if the sense of the relation is altered 
in these Bases, the position of the terms will be altered 
and consequently the properties of the terms will undergo 
substantial change. But it must be noticed, in the first 
place, that the terms in relation do not always occupy a 
peculiar position such that the change of that position does 
necessarily involve some change of the properties of the 
relata. Take for example the symmetrical relation of 
'equal to'. Whatever the terms might be that are related 
by the relation of equality they do not occupy a peculiar 
position in the relational situation consisting of the terms
* This does not imply that in every case of relation there is 
a unity or whole. All that it implies is that every case 
of relation is a complex case consisting of many particulars
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and the relation. If A is equal to B, then B is also 
equal to A. Even in some asymmetrical relations, such as 
'to the left of', the terms might change places without 
altering their non-relational properties (though of course 
not without altering relational ones such as position), 
Secondly, even in those places where the terms in relation 
do occupy each a peculiar place, the alteration of the 
position of the terms does not necessarily invest the 
relata .'With substantiaj-ly different properties. For 
example, A which is 2 inches long has the relation 'longer 
than* to B where B is 1 inch long. Now the positions of A 
and B cannot be altered without bringing in some change in 
the length of either A or B. Yet the internalist cannot 
claim such a change to be a substantial change absolutely. 
Whether it is so or not depends on how you describe A and B.
SECTION II
Among recent advocates of the theory of internal 
relations we see a tendency to draw support for their 
doctrine from the analysis of the relation of cause and 
effect. vie get a clear glimpse of this tendency in the 
v/ritings of people like A. 0. Ewing and Prof. B. Blanshard.
* For a discussion on a similar topic see page 81.
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In his book titled 'Idealism* Ewing discusses the nature of 
causal connection and tries to establish that the universe 
is a system with the help of two arguments, viz., (a) all 
things in the universe are either directly or indirectly 
causally related to the rest of the universe and (b) being 
causàlly related involves being related by a relation of log­
ical entailment. The presence of this relation implies, 
according to him, that the nature of any one thing, taken 
by itself, is incomplete and internally incoherent without 
the whole system on v/hich it depends. But although he 
considers the universe to be a system in which everything 
is internally related to everything else, he says that it 
does not imply that all relations are internal in some of the 
important senses of the term such as making a difference to the 
relata, or being such that none of the relata could exist 
unless the other existed, Prof. Blanshard is obviously 
influenced by arguments such as these and uses the argument 
that being causally related involves being logically or 
necessarily related as one of the sets of arguments trying to 
demonstrate the stronger thesis that all relations of all 
things a_e internal, Ewing tries to connect his arguments 
with the comments of certain internalists in the following way. 
Some internalists lodge a common complaint against 
the externalists in various words. In simple phraseology, 
their complaint is that bare external conjunctions are
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irrational. Thus Bradley says that the view of the 
externalists makes relations "mere conjunctions" and that 
mere conjunctions are ’irrational*. (-./c have air cad-y-'r of erred
W-this complaint on page >^ f--this-.Qijeg-t-e-r-)-. Bradley
bases on this argument the view that relations must be 
grounded in their terms. "The process and its result to 
the terms, if they contribute nothing to it, seems really
irrational throughout. But, if they contribute anything,
they must surely be affected i n t e r n a l l y . J o a c h i m  says 
that the doctine of external relations reduced relations 
to irrational coincidences, and that external relation is 
not an answer to the problem of how things can be related 
and yet remain independent but only a name for the problem 
to be solved. Similar remarks are made by Bosanquet, 
who says that every science rejects relatively 'bare con­
junctions'. He asks: "Is there any man of science, who, . . .i
apart from philosophical controversy, will accept a bare |
2 'given injunction as conceivably ultimate truth?" It appears 
that the 'irrationality' of which these thinkers complain 
would only disappear if all relations could be regarded as 
logically following from their terms or from a whole in which
lo Appearance and Reality, p.515. I
2. The Distinction Between Mind And Its Objects, B.Bosanquet
pp. 59-60. I
* Of. The Nature of Truth, H.Joachim, p. 44ff. I
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their terms are included. All this seems to assume that 
the connections of different things and different events 
are capable of a rational explanation deducible a priori 
from their nature.
The advocate of external relations, Ewing remarks, 
would presumably deny that there is any need to suppose the 
relations of things to be intelligible. He would say that, 
even if it is the business of the scientist in some sense 
to look for causes, this is not to seek to reveal the logical 
ground of the effect, and it does not imply that the causes 
he finds have any internal logical connection with their 
effects. To this controversy. Swing writes, the key is the 
concept of causality and he therefore embarks on a long 
discussion about the nature of causation. After some dis­
cussion hev.tries_to show that the universe is a system, in 
the sense that there is a direct or indirect causal connection 
between everything in the universe and that being causally 
connected involves being connected by a relation of logical 
entailment. But, as we have remarked just a little while 
ago, Ewing is not a thorough-going internalist. He maintains 
that the proposition, 'Everything in the universe is internally 
related to the rest of the universe' does not logically 
exclude the proposition, 'Some of the relations between 
these things are external to them. *
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Prof. Blanshard takes his cue from writings 
like this, and being an extreme internalist he produces a 
similar set of apparently strong arguments which he uses 
as one of the sets of arguments pointing to the internality 
of all relations in his book, 'The Nature of Thought.'
We should therefore examine these arguments if 
we want to refute the doctrine of internal relations,
Blanshard actually uses a number of arguments 
in favour of the internality of relations. But we shall 
concentrate only on those arguments dealing with the nature 
of causal relations, not because these are the strongest 
ones, but because most of the others are indebted to a large 
extent to Bradley's arguments on internality and externality 
of relations which we have already dealt with in the preceding 
chapter.
With regard to Causality Blanshard says that there 
are two propositions about causality which, if they could be 
shown to be true, would establish that everything in the 
universe is internally related to everything else. The 
propositions are, firstly, that "all things are causally 
related directly or indirectly;" and secondly, that "being
o
causally related involves being logically related,"
1, The Nature of Thought, Blanshard, 2nd vol. p,492,
2. Ibid, p.492,
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Now it is difficult to see what Blanshard thinks 
he has proved with the help of these arguments. Even if 
these arguments are valid, all that they would establish 
at most is that all the things of the universe are related 
by a relation that is necessary. But if Blanshard thinks 
that these sets of arguments could be used, like the other 
sets of arguments in his:.chapter on internal relations, in 
demonstrating the validity of the general thesis that all 
relations are internal then we must remark that they would 
not be sufficient to prove the thesis. The proposition 
that all the -^hf^us of the universe are related by a relation 
that is necessary does not imply that all the relations 
bet v/e en all these things are internal. Secondly, I do not 
believe that even Blanshard *s claim that all the things of 
the universe are related by a relation that involves logical 
necessity, viz., the relation of causality, is a valid one. 
And in what follows I shall try to show that the arguments 
Blanshard uses in order to prove his above thesis are not 
cogent. Although Blanshard produces a number of arguments 
in trying to establish the truth of both these propositions, 
in examining Blanshard's view I propose to confine our atten­
tion to the second proposition, viz., "being causally related 
involves being logically related." The reason is that if 
we succeed in demonstrating the falsity of the second propo­
sition, then even if the first proposition be true, the claim
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to establish the internality of all relations will not be 
justified since even if all things are causally related, 
that does not mean that they are logically related#
’/e should now take a look at the arguments advanced 
by Elanshard in support of his claim that causal relations 
involve logical necessity. The arguments he advances fall 
under three heads:-
(a) The first evidence of such necessity, he 
says, is to be found in the realm of inference. Here, our 
entertainment of the premise is the cause (or part of the cause] 
of the emergence of the conclusion in our minds. He does 
not say that causality reduces to logical necessity. He 
only holds that “when one passes in reasoning from ground 
to consequent the fact that the ground entails the consequent 
is one of the conditions determining the appearance of this 
consequent rather than something else in the thinker's mind.
Thus entertaining the premise determines, or tends to determine, 
our thoughts taking one course (viz. entertaining the 
conclusion) rather than entertaining some other premise since 
one of the objects of the two thoughts logically entails 
the other.
But do the arguments he produces really prove that 
inference, which involves a causal relation, involves also
1# Nature of Thought, p.496.
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a logical relation? One doubts v/hether it is so.
v/e say that there is a necessary connection between 
being a triangle and having 3 angles. If anything is a 
triangle then it is logically necessary that it will have 
3 angles. Yet one might entertain a premise without 
being able to deduce the conclusion, although the premise 
entails the conclusion. It is a common occurrence with 
school children that they are sometimes unable to see what 
certain premises in geometry entail though they have the 
premises clearly before them which logically entail the 
conclusion. Yet if two things are necessarily related, 
then given the one the other must follow. It is true that 
in the case of a valid inference the premise logically 
entails the consequent, yet that is not sufficient to establish 
the necessary appearance of the thought of the conclusion 
in the thinker's mind,
Blanshard might say at this point that what he 
means by saying that causality involves logical necessity is 
that if one thing is an effect then among all the factors 
conditioning it; logical necessity must be one. He tries 
to prove the validity of this argument by demonstrating the 
presence of such logical necessity in various cases of 
causation. In the case of inference such a necessary factor, 
he claims, is the premise's logically entailing the conclusion*
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Now that the existence of the logical relation 
of entailment is not a necessary condition of the causation 
of the thought of the conclusion by the entertaining of the 
premise is also shown by Prof. Ernest Nagel in his essay 
ti:t‘led"- 'Sovereign Reason. ' It often happens, he says, 
that a man, by entertaining a premise arrives at an invalid 
conclusion. In such a case the thought of the premise 
is a cause or part of the cause of the thought of the 
conclusion, and hence two thoughts are causally related, 
yet the propositions about which he is thinking do not 
logically imply one another.
Protests naturally arose against Mr. Blanshard*s 
bold claim that aausality involves an element of logical 
necessity. It has been argued against him that since 
logical relations are timeless how can they be elements of 
causal relations which connect temporal events? It would 
be as meaningless to say that one such event entails another 
as to say that the premises cause the conclusion. In 
answer to such an objection he says that the events causality 
connects are not naked events endowed v/ith no sort of 
character, “if what happens is nothing, then nothing 
happens. Logic deals with characters. Hence one can
1. IhelMature of Thought, p.497.
* Of. Sovereign Reason, pp. 287-288
103
safely say that the characters dealt with by logic are 
an integral part of the causal processes found in inference. 
Prom this he takes the further step that the relations between 
these characters also enter into the causal processes. In 
support of his claim he cites the example of association by 
similarity. And he says “it would be idle to deny that 
the similarity of content does at times have something to 
do with the appearance of an a s s o c i a t e , ( B y  appearance 
he perhaps means here the appearance of the associate in 
the mind). Thus a relation v/ithin the content, he shows, 
plays a part in the causation of events.
But does the example cited above establish Blan­
shard 's point? It could have done so only if the relation 
of similarity were a logical relation. That it isn't, is 
obvious enough, A relation of similarity in size between 
a halfpenny and a shilling is sometimes causally responsible 
for the operation of a gas meter, but it is absurd to hlaim 
that there is a logical relation between the shilling and 
the halfpenny,
Blanshard also uses a reductio ad absurdum to 
convince his readers of the presence of necessity in/causality 
displayed in inference. He says that "unless necessity does 
play a part in the movement of inference, no argument will
l.l\c Nature of Thought, pp. 497-498.
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establish a n y t h i n g . I f  the special character of the
evidence and the cogency of the argument do not lay under
some degree of compulsion the course of thought towards
accepting the conclusion, “no conclusions are ever arrived
2
at because the evidence requires them.“ In the absence 
of the necessary connection we can no longer say that the 
premises require the conclusion and consequently the 
argument would become invalid, it would not establish any­
thing.
Some one might say at this stage that it is true 
that unless the premises of the inference entail the con­
clusion, the inference becomes invalid. Yet there is nothing 
in that admission that requires that necessity does play a 
part in the movement of inference. If anything does play 
such a part at all, it is the apprehension of necessity. 
Blanshard anticipates such an objection and attempts an 
answer in his book 'Reason and Analysis' in the following way.
He says there that such an explanation of the 
emergence of the conclusion assumes what has to be proved.
What we have to explain is how the conclusion emerges in our 
thought. Now to perceive that the premise entails the 
conclusion, we must have both of them clearly in mind, and
1.The Nature of Thought, pp. 497-49 8.
2, Ibid.
105.
this is equivalent to saying that the conclusion emerged 
because it had already made its appearance.
What Blanshard has said above is true? But v/e 
must point out here that Blanshard himself is guilty of 
begging the question when he says that what causes the 
emergence of the conclusion in the thinker's mind is the 
logical entailment between the premise and the conclusion. 
He assumes from the start that there must be a cause 
responsible for the appearance of a certain conclusion in 
the mind. A human mind is a highly complex entity. 
Thousands of thoughts could have crossed a mind when one 
thought emerges in it. It is extremely difficult to say 
what causes what thought in a human mind. It may be that 
some of the thoughts are not caused at all. But Blanshard 
is assuming from the start that the emergence of the con­
clusion in a man's mind must be caused. And since he 
cannot find any other thing that could be entrusted with 
that causal task, he fancies the logical entailment to 
perform that task.
(b) But although, Blanshard maintains, the 
influence of causality is displayed most plainly in infer­
ence, it can be traced in other cases of mental causation 
as well, although its presence is not so evident in those 
spheres. Indeed, the necessity present in these spheres 
is, according to him, not absolute. There is an element
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of contingency here. There is no doubt that some of us will 
be very surprised at this comment. If we see that Norman 
is shorter than Henry, then we say that 'Henry is necessarily 
taller than Norman.' The statement does not assert that 
Henry may be taller than Norman. It asserts that Henry 
must be so. If anything is a triangle then it must have 
3 angles equal to two right angles. Yet Blanshard remarks, 
“necessity, whatever our first impressions, is a matter 
of more or less, and that between a complete demonstration 
and a mere accidental conjunction it may be present in very 
many degrees. It seems that Blanshard is taking the 
ear-mark of necessity to be something other than what 
we usually take it to be. Th^s becomes evident if we con­
sider some such remarks of Blanshard as the following:
“A painter is painting a landscape that is half 
completed, and he finds himself moved to put a tree in 
the foreground. Is such a development normally quite
unintelligible? Certainly most painters would not say so.
Is it then an example of pure necessity? No again; it
2 -clearly falls somewhere between.“ it seems that Blanshard 
is taking the ear-marks of accidental conjunction and 
necessity to be unintelligibility and intelligibility
1 .The Nature of Thought, p.499.
2. Ibid, pp. 499-500.
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respectively. But does it really follow then that wherever 
there is intelligibility there is necessity? Intelligibility 
can at best be the sign of the absence of causal contingency. 
When we understand why an occurrence is like that and not 
otherwise, we can at most claim that there is some cause 
for its being thus, that it is causally necessary. But it 
if a far cry to say that intelligibility is the sign of 
logical necessity. Yet Blanshard seems to be claiming that. 
Take for example his remark on page 500 of The Nature of 
Thought: “Does the , . . premise here, 'All who think
lightly of their own deserts are grateful', express a causal 
or a logical connection? V/e suggest that it expresses both. 
If a man whom we know to think little of himself proves 
grateful for another's esteem, is that, apart from inductions 
made on such people in the past, , . . as unpredictable and 
unintelligible, as if he had begun talking in a Sumerian 
tongue?"^ He admits that it is true that one cannot isolate 
in human nature the precise reciprocating conditions of 
gratitude, or formulate one's law as anything better than 
a tendency ; but that, after all, is not utter darkness ;
Mlwe do have some insight into why the man of low self-esteem
2
should be grateful for the esteem of others." He quotes
l.Ihe Nature of Thought, p, 500
2. Ibid.
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v;ith approval some of Ewing's remarks ; “It seems to me
that we can see and to some extent really understand v/hy
an insult should tend to give rise to anger . . It
should be noted however, that Blanshard himself admits that
the alleged law connecting low self-esteem and gratitude
states only a ''tendency", not an invariable connection, to
which therefore exceptions may (and presumably do) occur.
And the sense in which a law expressing only such a tendency
also expresses a logical necessity seems very obscure to 
*
us »
(c) It is time to look at Blanshard's third 
set of arguments attempting to prove the internality of 
all relations, lith the help of these arguments he tries 
to prove that logical necessity is present even in causality 
found in physical nature. And there is no doubt that the 
claims he makes in this section constitute a very important 
part of his defence of the internality of relations in 
general. In this section Blanshard brings out a number 
of objections against the regularity view, according to which 
all that we can sensibly mean by saying that A causes 3 
is that whenever there occurs one event of the kind A - 
defined as precisely as possible - it is followed by an 
event of the kind B - defined with similar care.
1. A.C.Bwing , Idealism, p.176.
* I am indebted for this comment to Prof, Nagel's book, 
Sovereign Reason; see Sovereign Reason, p.291.
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But even if the objections against the regularity 
view be valid, since Bradley's view is a contrary and not 
the contradictory of the regularity view, we are not thereby 
compelled to accept the view which Blanshard puts forward 
if the arguments for it are not wholly cogent. We should 
now look at the arguments themselves,
#e can make successful predictions concerning 
future occurrences of events on the basis of observing 
past sequence of events. In order to do so we need to 
argue: because b has followed a in the past, it will con­
tinue to do so. Now unless a is connected with b by some­
thing more than mere conjunction there is no ground for 
this argument whatever. We cannot save the argument by 
saying that whenever we have argued from past uniform 
sequence of events to future uniform sequence of similar 
events, we have found our expectations verified. Because 
verification itself is also another sequence and hence 
cannot claim any special merit on account of which it can 
justify the argument from any past sequence of events to 
their future connection. The answer that is often given to 
justify such inductive arguments is that such arguments 
are valid since they are based on the uniformity of nature, 
that is ; they are based on the principle, 'same cause, same 
effecti Now since uniformity of nature is the principle 
of the argument, it must be more than a chance conjunction
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of symbols or characters, otherv/ise it cannot justify the 
argument. And hence the connection between cause and effect 
in virtue of which we predict their future connection is 
always implicitly taken as intrinsic. Now it is implied 
that this connection is a necessary one,
Blanshard gives further elucidation of his con­
tention. He says that what justifies the statement 'same 
cause, same effect', is an insight of ours to the effect that 
when something is the cause of something else it produce# 
its effect by virtue of its special nature. If a cause's 
special character is in no way involved in the production 
of the effect, why say it. produced something? But to say 
that *a produces something by virtue of its special nature' 
is to imply that the connection between a and its product 
is a necessary one. In Blanshard's own words, “To say that 
a produces x in virtue of being a and yet that, given a,
X might not follow, is inconsistent with the laws of identity 
and contradiction.“ Bor “a's behaviour is the outgrowth 
or expression of a's nature. And to assert that a's 
behaviour, so conceived, could be different while a was the 
same would be to assert that something both did and did not 
issue from the nature of a. And that is self-contradiction. 
The statement would also, . . . conflict with the law of
identity. It implies that a thing may remain itself when 
you have stripped from it everyt..ing which it is such as
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to be and to do. To strip it of these things would be
to strip it, so to speak, of the suchness that makes it 
what it is, i.e., to say that it is other than it is,"^
Let us analyse the consequences of his contention 
in some detail. According to him the strangling of 
Desdemona by Othello was the outgrowth of Othello's special 
nature, and to fancy that Othello had not acted as he in 
fact did would be to strip him of the suchness that made him 
whajt he was. It then follows that the compound proposition 
'Othello strangled Desdemona, but it is nevertheless logically 
possible for Othello not to have done so', is logically 
impossible. Hence according to this argument every true 
proposition which imputes a causal action to Othello or 
to any other individual is logically necessary.
Since according to Blanshard Othello's behaviour 
is the expression of Othello's nature, in the absence of 
his benaviour of strangling his nature must be logically 
admitted to have altered.
V/hat then is a particular individual's nature?
'"/e must admit that it is extremely difficult to answer this, 
since the term 'nature' is used in a wide variety of senses. 
Yet we can get some hint as to what Blanshard means by the
1,The Nature of Thought, pp. 513-14.
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nature of a non-relational thing. By the nature of a 
non-relational thing he means its properties. " %  the 
nature of an apple we mean its roundness, its redness, its 
juiciness, and so o n . B u t  what properties of Othello 
will be altered if Othello did not kill Desdemona? It is 
extremely difficult to point to any such property. But of 
course Othello would no longer possess the relational 
property of being the killer of Desdemona. And the absence 
of such property might be said to imply then the alteration 
of Othello's nature if and only if Othello's nature is made 
identical with the total set of attributes that may be truly 
predicated of him. But then the argument will be reduced 
to a tautology. It will be like saying 'if all the proper­
ties that are actually predicable of x were not truly predic­
able of X, then the properties that are actually predicable 
of X could not be truly predicated of x . '
In his book, Reason And Analysis, which is pub­
lished later than 'The Nature of Thought', Blanshard tries 
to answer a number of possible and actual objections against 
the view that necessary connection is present in the relation 
of cause and effect. He deals to a considerable extent 
with the objections directed against the presence of necessary 
connection in inference. However, the answers do not seem 
to me to be very satisfactory. In what follows we shall try
1. 3h^iature of Thought, p.478.
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to have a glimpse at some of these answers.
In answer to the objection that even if the 
necessity linking the propositions does work causally, the 
emergence of the conclusion is conditioned by many other 
factors like the thinker’s interest in the argument, the 
normal functioning of his brain, he says that he does not 
maintain that the logical relation of entailment between the 
propositions is the sufficient cause for the appearance of 
the conclusion. He claims to assert only this that this 
relation is a necessary condition of the mental event. But 
we have already shown on page 102 of this chapter that the 
existence of such a necessary connection is not a sine qua 
non for an inference. And I do not see any need to repeat 
it here.
He makes some fresh attempts to answer a very vital 
objection to his thesis which we have already examined him 
trying to answer on page 102. The objection is toihe effect 
that causality links events, and that a timeless relation 
is no event. Blanshard*s answer to it is that although 
the common conception of cause is the sufficient cause or 
the conspicuous change occurring just before the occurrence 
of the effect in the proximity, yet this conception is based 
on an arbitrary selection and the word should be legitimately 
applied to the sum of the conditions given which alone the
114.
effect will occur. And in this sense of the word the
necessity linking the objects of the thought cannot be
omitted from the cause. Yet there is nothing in this
argument to shovf that a logical necessity can be a condition.
Each of the examples of the necessary condition he has been
able to give, in the course of the arguments, except the
unique condiüon of necessity, is either an event or a thing
or its character like the exerting of the normal pull by
gravitation, density of the air, a particular level of the 
*
table o
V/e will finish examining Blanshard’s claim that 
the causal relation is a necessary one, by observing a 
comment he makes on pp. 479-471 of his Reason And Analysis,
Here he reiterates his claim, which we have already 
examined on page 110 that to assert a causal connection 
between two particulars say a and b is to say that a produces 
b in virtue of its special nature, and to assert this is to 
assert a necessary connection between a and b. He quotes 
in support of this H. W . B. Joseph's assertion, "So long 
therefore as it is a, it must act thus ; and to assert that 
it may act otherwise on a subsequent occasion is to assert 
that what is a is something else than a which it is declared 
to be."  ^ He remarks that this is certainly true if the
1. H.V/,B,Joseph, Introduction to Logic, 2nd ed,p,407
* See page 457 of Blanshard*s Reason And Analysis.
115
causal properties of a thing are introduced into its
definition. Gold is soluble in aqua regia. If gold
did not dissolve in aqua regia we should not call it gold.
And he considers at this point a comment made by Stebbing
that we do not include in the nature of a thing all its
*
causal properties. He agrees with Stebbing on this
point. He admits that we do not commonly include in the
nature of a ball the causal property of being capable of
initiating motion in another if it strikes the other with
a certain velocity. But he rejects her claim that the
causal relation referred to above is an external relation
by saying, that, including a causal property in the definition
is not the only way of arguing for its internality. "Even
if a thing ^  not its behaviour", he says, "still if we say
that it behaves in this way in virtue of having this nature,
that it is such as to behave in this way, then we are saying,
I suggest, that it could not lack the causal property while
possessing this nature . . . .  if it is in virtue of roundness
that the ball rolls, then a ball that was unable to roll,
1would not be a ball." There is surely something odd about 
this claim. An interna^l-ist like Blanshard would say that 
'food must nourish*. But what exactly does such an assertion 
mean? Does it mean 'food is that which nourishes'? But is
1. Reason And Analysis, p.471.
/Stebbing,
* Gf A Modern Introduction to Logic/pp. 285 ff
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it then a necessary statment? An internalist like Blanshard 
would certainly say that it is so, because if anything is 
food then it must nourish. Yet we see so many conditions 
under which food does not nourish, e.g. if any person who 
eats food cannot digest it then food does not nourish him.
But in that case an internalist would say that it is wrong 
to call something food if it does not nourish, 'Pood* 
means 'that which nourishes', But in that case the thesis 
of the internalist would be reduced to a tautology like 
'that which nourishes nourishes',
V/e have examined to a considerable extent the 
arguments of some internalists who try to draw support for 
their theory by the analysis of the relation of cause and 
effect. We will sum up the discussion by saying that our 
examination of their arguments has revealed to us that there 
is nothing in them that can establish either that all 
relations are internal or even that all things in the 
universe are related by a logically necessary relation, 
namely, the relation of causality.
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Concluding Remarks
I do not think that it is necessary to go into 
further exposition and examination of the arguments advanced 
for and against the doctrine of internal relations! My 
main concern in the present paper has been with giving a 
critical exposition of the doctrine of internal relations,
I have examined to a considerable extent the main arguments 
brought forward by philosophers for the doetrine, And I 
hope that I have said enough to indicate that there is no 
reason why we should accept the claims of an internalist, 
at least without further qualification, that all relations 
are internal in the sense that the absence of any relation 
whatsoever would entail necessary alteration of the related 
things,
I do not think that the arguments brought forward 
by the supporters of the doctrine of internal relations are 
strong enough to establish the claim that all relations 
between objects are internal in the absolute sense, But do 
we necessarily have to accept the view that all relations are 
external if we deny the doctrine that all are internal? It 
is difficult to give a straightforward answer to such a 
question. Several points need to be made clear At this 
stage. In the first place, I must admit that the arguments 
1 have so far come across in favour of the externality of
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all relations do not appear to me to be very convincing. 
People like Russell are supposed to be extreme externalists 
who admit nothing beyond simple terms and external relations, 
Yet all his energy seems to be directed towards refuting 
the view that all relations are reducible to qualities of 
the relata or relational wholes, which view he takes to 
be the fundamental tenet of the internalists, (See 
Russell's 'Principles of Mathematics', pp,224-226 and p,222; 
'My Philosophical Development', p,54, p,55 f ; 'Logic and 
Knowledge', p.335; 'Philosophical Essays', pp. 163f, 166- 
167).
I think that Russell is right in his contention 
that relations cannot be reduced to qualities or adjectives 
of the relata or of the relational complexes. Yet the 
main thesis of the internalists does not consist only in 
claiming relations to be properties of the relata or 
relational complexes, And Russell has not explicitly made 
any attempt to refute the further contention of the intern­
alists that every relation, though not a property, gives 
rise to a property which is infernal to the relata in the 
sense that their absence would entail essential modification 
of the terms,
I think we cannot find any better way of refuting 
such a claim than by turning our attention to Moore *s
*
arguments which we have considered in the second chapter,
* See pp, 73 - 75.
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Bollov/ing l.oore we can successfully show that the claim 
of an internalist that in the case of every relational 
property which a thing has it is always true that the thing 
which has it would have been different if it had not had 
that property is definitely wrong. But as we have remarked 
before, Moore is willing to admit the internality of some 
relational properties.
Shall we then admit that there is no way in which 
we can maintain the externality of all relations? Now 
it must be admitted that if we look a little closely at 
the instances Moore advances in his essay, ’External 
Relations’, in trying to show the internality of some of 
the relational properties, then we will find that even 
the internality of these properties really depends upon 
how you describe the things that have these relational 
properties,
In his essay, ’External Relations’, Moore says that 
the relational provx-^rty 'having this as a spatial part ’ is 
internal to a whole. He says with regard to a whole 
coloured patch half of which is red and half yellow, "That 
particular whole could not have existed without having that 
particular patch for a part. "from the proposition with 
regard to any term whatever that it does not contain that 
particular patch it follows that the term is other than the
lo Philosophical Studies, G.E.Moore, p.288
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whole in question Yet considering the relation
which the red patch has to the whole patch, he says, "the
red patch might perfectly well have existed without being
2
part of that particular whole," Thus, according to Moore, 
the relational property ’being a spatial part of this whole’ 
is not internal to the red patch. Yet 'having this for a 
spatial part ’ is c.n internal property of the whole patch 
half of which is red and half yellow.
But it must be admitted that even calling these 
properties internal depends really upon some linguistic 
considerations, upon how one describes the terms that have 
these relational properties, upon how one identifies the 
patches. In particular, a patch may or may not be identified 
in terms of either its position in a whole or the parts 
it contains. If it is identified in terms of the position 
it has, then the property of having that position will be 
internal to it, Again, if it is identified as being the 
whole which contains such and such parts, then the property 
of containing those parts will be internal to it. Moore's 
attempt to say that the property of having such and-' such 
patch for a part is internal, while being a part of such and 
such a larger patch is external, presumably stands or falls
lo Philosophical Studies, G.E.Moore, p.288.
2. Ibid, p.288.
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with sayin^ that to identify a patch in terms of its being 
the whole which contains such and such parts is more 
plausible or acceptable than to identify a patch in terms 
of its being a part of such and such a whole. Thus we 
see that even calling the property of ’having this for a 
part’ internal really depends upon what is considered as 
being the more plausible 'way of defining something. Hence 
even the properties that Moore claims to be internal cannot 
be held to be so absolutely.
But someone might ask me at this stage, 'will you 
then maintain that all relations are external?* How I 
must say that the maintaining of the externality of all 
the relational properties in the case of particular existing 
things seems to depend on many considerations. Although 
the externality of most of the relational properties seems 
to me to be easier to maintain in this case, as compared to 
the cases of the universels, yet maintaining the externality 
of all tjhe relational properties, even in this sphere, is 
impossible without discussing some controversial topics 
that are associated with it.
Take for example the relational property 'being 
more rational than a certain horse * that Socrates might be 
said to possess. Is it an external property of Socrates?
Obviously, the answer to such a question depends 
on many things. If I describe Socrates as a man then of 
course, assuming the definition of 'man* as a 'rational
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animal', such a property must be regarded as an internal 
property of Socrates. But then there is the risk of 
admitting the internality of such a relational property 
at the cost of a certain truism. Saying that 'being more 
rational ' is an internal property is really expressing the 
fact that 'being rational' is an internal property of man.
Now that being rational is an internal property of a human 
being is one way of expressing the fact that 'what is a 
rational animal must be rational *. If on the other hand 
you point to a certain indistinct patch of colours moving 
behind a bush at a certain distance and say "That moving 
patch is Socrates", then of course it is obvious that the 
relational property 'being more rational than a certain 
horse' is not an internal property of what you point to, 
even though what you point to is Socrates (because it Is not 
an internal property of moving patches as such). But then 
the question arises whether we can properly describe Socrates 
as 'that moving patch*. People might object to such an 
identification of Socrates with 'that moving patch*. 
Obviously, they might say, Socrates cannot be said to possess 
all the properties of 'that moving patch'. 'That moving 
patch * might be indistinct, it might get smaller as it moves. 
But can one sensibly speak of Socrates as possessing those 
properties? In a sense then the question of the internality 
or externality of relations depends to a large extent on
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certain linguistic considerations, on the question how one 
describes the things related.
It is obvious from our discussion that the question 
of the internality or externality of relations is also 
closely associated with essences. The question whether a 
certain relational property is internal to A thing or not 
depends on whether in its absence the thing changes essentially 
Now it is highly controversial whether individuals have any 
essences or not. Moreover, the question what is meant by 
individual essences is also controversial. Are we to take 
the Aristotelian sense of essence according to which the 
essence of an individual distinguishes an individual from 
members of different species? (According to such a sense 
of 'essence* the 'essence * of an individual like Socrates 
is being human). Or are we to take the other sense of 
individual essence, according to which the 'essence ' of an 
individual is the collection of those properties that differ­
entiate an individual member of one class from other members 
of the same class? (In this sense the essence of Socrates 
would be the assemblage of properties peculiar to Socrates).
If we take the latter sense of essence, then the relational 
property of 'having Xanthippe for wife * and 'drinking hemlock* 
is internal to Socrates ; whereas it is not so if we take 
the former sense of essence.
Thus we see that the issue of the internality or
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externality of relations cannot be settled absolutely 
without discussing some of the controversial topics that 
are associated with it like the problem of description, the 
problem of individual essences. ' N In general the problem 
of description of the terms does not arise much in the 
case of deciding the internality of the relations between 
universels. Take for example the relational property 
'being intermediate in shade betv/een red and yellow' that 
the universal 'orange' colour possesses or the relational 
property 'being half of 8' that the number 4 possesses.
These properties seem to be internal to the terms irrespective 
of how we describe the terms related. Their withdrawal 
does not seem to be possible without a complete change of 
the terms related. Here one cannot possibly say that even 
the internality of these properties depends on how you 
describe the terms. One cannot say that if you describe 
the terms as numbers or as colours, then of course the 
absence of these properties would not imply a complete alter­
ation of the terms, on the grounds that then v/e need say no 
longer that what v/e are considering here is the relation 
between 4 and 8, or the relation between the colour orange 
and the colours red and yellow. Again, we cannot sensibly
say that if we call the number 4 'the whole number that falls
between the whole numbers 3 and 5 then the relational property 
'is half of 8' is not internal to it. Yet we can sensibly
say that if we call the queen 'the present monarch of the
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United Kingdom’ then the relational property ’is the wife 
of Prince Philip’ is not internal to the %ueen,*
Thus it appears to me that it is easier to 
maintain the internality of relations in the cases of
* There is undoubtedly the possibility of an objection to 
what I maintain here. It might be said that the 
question whether the relational properties concerned 
are internal to the numbers depends on how the numbers 
are introduced. No doubt the number 9 would not be 
the number 9 if it were not the square of 3* But it 
is a fact, though a contingent one, that there are 
9 planets. Therefore the number 9 can be described 
as ’the number of the planets’. Now would it be 
the case that the number of the planets would not be 
the number of the planets if it were not the square 
of 3? One might feel inclined to say that the number 
of the planets could very well be the number of the 
planets without being the square of 3 because there 
might in fact (unknown to the astronomers) be 10 
planets, and even if there are in fact 9 planets 
there might have been 10 planets. Similar objections 
might also be raised with regard to the colours that 
we have so far been considering. It might be said 
that if the colour orange be described as the colour 
of the dress Miss Jones is wearing, then it becomes 
doubtful whether it would not be the colour of Miss 
Jones’ dress if it were not intermediate in shade 
between red and yellow (since it is a contingent 
fact that the colour of Miss Jones’ dress is orange, 
which dress might have been of any other colour).
But I must emphasise here the fact that my 
view here that it is easier to maintain the internality 
of the relational properties of the universels is 
only a prima facie view, to which objections of the 
kind stated above do exist. Neither am I interested 
in proving the internality of all these relational 
properties. I am only suggesting the possibility of 
their internality. My main concern in this paper is 
with examining the claims of the internalists to the 
effect that all relations are internal.
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universals. Por this reason I remarked at the beginning* 
that what appears more plausible to me between the different 
views as to the internality or externality of relations is 
the moderate view that some relations are internal and some 
external. Yet even in the sphere of universals we shall 
be confronted with the issue whether the distinction between 
the universal and the particular is a legitimate one, 
whether there is anything called a universal over and above 
the particular0 It seems then that even here we cannot 
really prove the internality of the relations between the 
universals without inviting some controversies. All that 
we can say here at most is that the internality of relational 
properties seems less difficult to maintain than the inter­
nality of the relational properties of particular physical 
objects.
Hence it seems desirable to consider those contro­
versial topics associated with the issue of external/internal 
relations referred to above for an absolutely thorough 
treatment of the issue of the internality or externality of 
relations. But a thorough discussion of these associated 
problems is beyond, the scope of the present paper. It will 
demand at least (if not more) as much space .as I have 
devoted so far in this paper to considering the arguments 
for and against the doctrine of the internality of relations.
* See page 5«
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But I must say this, that my main concern throughout the 
present paper has been with examining the claims of the 
doctrine of the"internality of all relations. And although 
we cannot entertain the thesis of the externality of all 
relations or the internality of some and externality of 
others without bringing in some discussions on those 
controversial topics associated with the problem of the 
characterisation of relational properties as external or 
internal, we can say at least this that neither can the 
thesis of the internality of all relational properties of 
all relata be maintained absolutely. The internality of 
some relational properties appears to be easier to maintain, 
yet even proving that requires discussion of a lot of 
controversial topics which is impossible 'in the present 
space. Neither am I interested in proving.rather than 
suggesting the internality of some relational properties.
My main concern in the present thesis has all along been 
with a critical examination of the thesis of the internality 
of all relations. And I think I have shown enough to 
indicate that the supporters of the doctrine of internal 
relations cannot justifiably claim that all relations are 
internal absolutely, without adding any further qualification 
to their statement.
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